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Since the 1950s, prominent constitutional law professors have often invoked the 
notion that the Supreme Court acts as an educational institution in American society. 
On this view, legal scholarship portrays the Supreme Court as a beneficent and 
inspirational teacher, one who is responsible for imparting unusually enlightened values 
on the nation. Despite this uplifting analogy’s prevalence within constitutional discourse, 
two persistent criticisms have unsettled the notion that the Supreme Court in fact teaches 
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any lessons at all through its written opinions. First, critics observe that citizens are 
generally unaware of even highly salient Supreme Court opinions, and it is hard for 
people to obtain a lesson from something they do not know. Second, critics note that 
claims extolling the Court’s educational capacities unfold almost exclusively on an 
abstract level, rendering it virtually impossible to determine whether anyone has 
absorbed the Court’s ostensible lessons and how that absorption occurred. 
This Article aims to revive and recast the notion that the Supreme Court educates 
by approaching the matter from a fresh vantage point. Rather than proceeding from 
the standard premise that the Supreme Court teaches good lessons, this Article inverts 
the inquiry by identifying and examining three opinions where the Supreme Court 
has taught bad lessons: Buck v. Bell’s validation of compulsory sterilization statutes; 
Minersville School District v. Gobitis’s validation of requirements that students 
salute the American flag; and New York v. Belton’s validation of police officers 
conducting warrantless searches of vehicles when they arrest motorists. Instead of 
simply asserting that the Supreme Court taught bad lessons in these three opinions, 
the Article offers specific evidence to defend that claim and also addresses the two 
primary criticisms of the view contending that the Court can educate. First, rather 
than suggesting that the Court taught citizens generally throughout the nation when 
it issued these opinions, this Article narrows the focus to identify particular subsets of 
the population that the opinions reached and influenced. Second, instead of offering 
merely abstract interpretations of how these opinions taught, this Article provides 
detailed historical accounts that identify and examine three particular mechanisms 
through which students responded to the Court’s bad teaching. Building on work 
exploring the phenomenon that political scientists refer to as “policy diffusion,” this 
Article demonstrates that the Supreme Court’s bad teachings led policymakers around 
the country to learn, emulate, and extrapolate from those opinions. Examining the 
Supreme Court’s bad lessons also better positions scholars to appreciate how the 
Supreme Court has taught well, both by helping desirable policies become more 
widespread and by suppressing undesirable policies. This reconceptualization of the 
Supreme Court’s teaching role challenges ascendant theories in legal scholarship 
asserting that the judiciary interprets the Constitution merely to ratify the nation’s 
consensus values and that it lacks the ability to implement significant social reform. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1952, Eugene Rostow formulated what would become an enduring 
metaphor within legal circles for describing the Supreme Court’s role in 
American life.1 “The Supreme Court is, among other things, an educational 
body, and the Justices are inevitably teachers,” Rostow contended.2 During 
the intervening seven decades, distinguished legal theorists holding a diverse 
array of competing intellectual commitments have embraced Rostow’s 
general concept that the Supreme Court is an educational institution.3 
Alexander Bickel, Robert Bork, Christopher Eisgruber, Jack Goldsmith, Lani 
Guinier, Neal Katyal, Ralph Lerner, Daryl Levinson, Sanford Levinson, 
Carol Steiker, Cass Sunstein, Laurence Tribe, Mark Tushnet, and Robin West 
represent only a fraction of the many scholars who have entertained the 
notion that Supreme Court opinions can, in one way or another, educate.4 
 
1 Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. REV. 193, 208 (1952). 
2 Id. 
3 See Christopher L. Eisgruber, Is The Supreme Court an Educative Institution?, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
961, 962 (1992) (“[A]n astonishing range of thinkers has endorsed some version of [Rostow’s] idea.”). 
4 See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT 
THE BAR OF POLITICS 26 (1962) (referring to the Court as “a great and highly effective educational 
institution”); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 249 (1990) (endorsing Rostow’s 
metaphor); Eisgruber, supra note 3, passim (offering an extended theoretical defense of the 
educational metaphor); Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, 
Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791, 1838 (2009) (noting Rostow’s metaphor “has 
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Rostow’s metaphor has reached beyond academia, moreover, as prominent 
judges have portrayed themselves as educators. To take only the foremost 
example, Justice Anthony Kennedy once proclaimed: “Judges are teachers. By 
our opinions, we teach.”5 
Although the educational metaphor has received acclamation from on 
high, the enthusiasm has not been universal. Scholars have leveled two 
persistent, related lines of critique against the notion that the Supreme Court 
educates. First, critics have cast doubt on the Supreme Court’s ability to teach 
lessons by noting that citizens—the Court’s presumed pupils6—demonstrate 
little awareness of even highly salient judicial opinions.7 As early as 1970, 
scholars quipped that if the Justices were teaching a class “it is a sad fact that 
few Americans are enrolled in the course.”8 Although this joke debuted more 
than fifty years ago, it seems to never grow old, as professors have repeatedly 
offered slight variations on the theme.9 Second, critics have protested that, 
because claims about the Court’s educational role proceed on an almost 
 
a distinguished pedigree in constitutional thought”); Lani Guinier, Foreword, Demosprudence 
Through Dissent, 122 HARV. L. REV. 4, 47 (2008) (“Supreme Court Justices teach.”); Neal Kumar 
Katyal, Judges as Advicegivers, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1709, 1720 (1998) (analyzing Rostow’s metaphor); 
Ralph Lerner, The Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmaster, 1967 SUP. CT. REV. 127, 128-29 
(depicting the Court as “an educator” in the context of exploring jury charges issued during the 
nation’s early history); Sanford Levinson, Courts as Participants in “Dialogue”: A View from American 
States, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 791, 794 (2011) (exploring Rostow’s metaphor); Carol S. Steiker, Brandeis 
in Olmstead: “Our Government is the Potent, the Omnipresent Teacher,” 79 MISS. L.J. 149, 178 (2009) 
(“Supreme Court Justices are, after all, part of the government, and they teach—perhaps most 
especially through their dissents.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword, Leaving Things Undecided, 110 
HARV. L. REV. 4, 69 (1996) (“It is sometimes observed that the Supreme Court’s decisions have 
educative effects.”); Laurence H. Tribe, Equal Dignity: Speaking Its Name, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 16, 
31 (2016) (advocating the idea that the Court “teaches”); Mark Tushnet, Style and the Supreme Court’s 
Educational Role in Government, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 215, passim (1994) (exploring the Court’s 
teaching role); Robin L. West, Foreword, Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 HARV. L. REV. 43, 103-05 
(1990) (suggesting “the educative role of Supreme Court opinions” may be particularly apparent in 
dissenting opinions). 
5 Anthony M. Kennedy, Assoc. Just., U.S. Sup. Ct., Remarks at Harvard Law School (March 11, 
2008), in Guinier, supra note 4, at 7. The writings of Aharon Barak, who served as President of the Israeli 
Supreme Court, suggest that the metaphor’s appeal is not limited to American jurists. See Aharon Barak, 
Foreword, A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 19, 38 (2002) 
(invoking Rostow explicitly and contending that “judges are also educators”). 
6 See, e.g., Eisgruber, supra note 3, at 973 (construing the Court’s students as “the American 
people”); Katyal, supra note 4, at 1720 (construing the Court as “teach[ing] citizens”). 
7 See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL 
CHANGE? 422 (2d ed. 2008) (“Only a minority of Americans know what the courts have done on 
important issues.”). 
8 James P. Levine & Theodore L. Becker, Toward and Beyond a Theory of Supreme Court Impact, 
13 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 561, 567 (1970). 
9 See, e.g., Helen J. Knowles, The Supreme Court as Civic Educator, 6 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 
252, 263 (2008) (“What if the Court holds ‘vital national seminars’ that no one attends?”); Eisgruber, 
supra note 3, at 1009 (“The Supreme Court may indeed conduct a ‘vital national seminar’ although 
attendance is spotty and few students do the reading.”). 
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exclusively theoretical plane, no evidence exists for evaluating whether the 
Court’s ostensible lessons actually have been acquired.10 Proponents of the 
educational metaphor, critics maintain, blithely assert that the Court teaches 
through its opinions without endeavoring to explain with any precision how 
that educational process transpires. 
These two criticisms contain undeniable force. They should not, however, be 
understood to extinguish the educational metaphor’s utility altogether. In order 
to appreciate how the educational metaphor retains vitality, it seems advisable 
to approach the issue from a fresh perspective. Scholars who have thus far 
explored this matter have overwhelmingly viewed the Supreme Court as a 
beneficent teacher, a knowledgeable and wise leader who imparts enlightened 
values on society. Rostow’s initial formulation embodied this exalted notion of 
the teacher, as he unveiled the metaphor in the context of suggesting that recent 
Court opinions had taught the nation invaluable lessons on racial equality.11 For 
Rostow, these opinions exerted an “immensely constructive influence” in 
spurring the nation to a richer comprehension of its constitutional and even its 
“moral” obligations toward Black citizens.12 Modern scholarship continues to 
endorse this exalted view, construing the Court as an “inspirational”13 teacher, 
one who “leads the people of the United States to a deeper understanding of our 
constitutional commitments.”14 When the Supreme Court teaches, this narrative 
runs, it invariably teaches well. 
Not all teaching, however, is good teaching. This Article inverts the 
standard approach by identifying and analyzing instances when the Supreme 
Court teaches a lesson, but imparts the lesson badly—instances, that is, when 
the Supreme Court has been a bad teacher. Bad teaching from the Supreme 
Court may arrive in a variety of different forms.15 The type that I explore 
 
10 See, e.g., ROSENBERG, supra note 7, at 28-30 (bemoaning the absence of empirical work 
attempting to demonstrate that the Court’s opinions educate); Eisgruber, supra note 3, at 1007 
(noting but not attempting to address empirical objections); Sunstein, supra note 4, at 69 (noting 
but not attempting to address empirical objections). 
11 See Rostow, supra note 1, at 208. Rostow does not identify the racial equality opinions he gestures 
toward, but the list he had in mind almost certainly would have included: Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 
(1950), McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950), and Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946). 
12 Rostow, supra note 1, at 208. 
13 Eisgruber, supra note 3, at 964; see also Guinier, supra note 4, at 40-42 (noting the ability of 
Justices to “inspire” in the context of discussing their educational role). 
14 Tushnet, supra note 4, at 215. Here, Tushnet is articulating the standard view, not necessarily 
embracing it as his own. 
15 Some classic examples arguably illustrating distinct types of bad teaching by the Supreme 
Court spring readily to mind. Brown v. Board of Education II, which ordered desegregation to occur 
with “all deliberate speed,” might be criticized as bad teaching because it was too lenient. See Brown 
v. Bd of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). But see JUSTIN DRIVER, THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE: 
PUBLIC EDUCATION, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE BATTLE FOR THE AMERICAN MIND 256-
64 (2018) (arguing that denunciations of Brown II fail to attend to significant historical constraints, 
and that it is the Court’s silence on school segregation during the Kennedy and Johnson 
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here, however, concerns what is perhaps the foulest form of all: the teacher 
who conveys the material in a substantively erroneous fashion. To select an 
almost painfully simple illustration of the phenomenon I will examine, 
consider a first-grade teacher who publicly commends a pupil for arriving at 
the conclusion that 2 + 2 = 5, a lesson that succeeds only in spreading 
inaccurate information throughout the class. In a similar vein, the Supreme 
Court sometimes issues opinions validating unconstitutionally repressive 
policies, and in the process transmits incorrect lessons about our 
constitutional order that subsequently become prevalent throughout the 
nation. In so doing, the Court provides instruction that not only fails to edify, 
but affirmatively misinforms. 
The Supreme Court’s bad teaching can be witnessed by examining the 
aftermaths of three notable opinions, each arising from a distinct temporal and 
constitutional context.16 In Buck v. Bell, the Supreme Court authorized Virginia’s 
compulsory sterilization statute, denying challenges under the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.17 In Minersville School 
District v. Gobitis, the Supreme Court authorized a Pennsylvania school to expel 
Jehovah’s Witness students for refusing to salute the American flag, rejecting a 
challenge under the First Amendment.18 In New York v. Belton, the Supreme 
Court authorized a police officer’s warrantless search of a vehicle when he 
arrested occupants, rebuffing a challenge under the Fourth Amendment.19 
Formally, Buck, Gobitis, and Belton merely permitted—and did not require—
policymakers to enact compulsory sterilization statutes, adopt mandatory flag 
salute measures, and execute warrantless searches of vehicles upon arresting 
motorists. But in the wake of these decisions, all three policies became 
dramatically more widespread, as the Court’s teachings stimulated successive 
waves of reform. In all three of these contexts, moreover, the Supreme Court 
ultimately recognized its bad teaching, by either outright reversing course or 
dramatically retreating from its prior decisions.20 Although the Supreme Court 
 
administrations that actually merits condemnation). Engel v. Vitale, which attempted to eliminate 
school-sponsored prayer and was roundly ignored in many areas, might be criticized as bad teaching 
because it was too demanding. See 370 U.S. 421, 433 (1962). Furman v. Georgia, which sought to end 
capital punishment in a highly fractured decision that featured separate writings from all nine 
Justices, might be criticized as bad teaching because it was too confusing. See 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 
(1972). Opinions highlighting other forms of bad teaching might easily be adduced. 
16 See, e.g., Corinna Barrett Lain, Three Supreme Court “Failures” and a Story of Supreme Court 
Success, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1019, 1019 (2016) (deeming Buck v. Bell a Supreme Court “failure,” and 
classifying it with Plessy and Korematsu). 
17 247 U.S. 200, 205, 207-08 (1927). 
18 310 U.S. 586, 592-93, 600 (1940). 
19 453 U.S. 454, 457, 460 (1981). 
20 See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536, 542-43 (1942) (invalidating a sterilization 
measure and dramatically retreating from Buck); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 
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can certainly issue opinions teaching bad lessons that it never officially 
recognizes as such, the Court’s recognition in these three contexts renders them 
particularly apposite case studies. 
In surveying these bad teaching moments, this Article rebuts the two 
primary criticisms of the notion that the Supreme Court possesses the ability 
to educate. First, in response to the claim that the Court cannot teach because 
citizens typically do not know its decisions, this Article narrows the frame of 
inquiry by identifying particular groups within the general populace who 
possess that knowledge. By focusing on discrete groups of actors relevant to 
a given case’s constitutional context, it becomes apparent that Supreme Court 
opinions have in fact taught lessons to some students. In response to Buck, 
legislators in statehouses around the nation—aided no doubt by the 
sterilization movement—demonstrated considerable awareness of the Court’s 
decision by enacting myriad statutes that essentially replicated the Virginia 
measure.21 Similarly, school administrators throughout the country revealed 
knowledge of Gobitis when they began expelling Jehovah’s Witnesses for 
refusing to salute the flag, and justifying those expulsions with the judicial 
decision.22 Finally, and most intuitively, many police departments relied on 
Belton when they started instructing officers to conduct warrantless searches 
on vehicles when arresting motorists.23 Thus, while few Americans may have 
registered for the Supreme Court’s offering in constitutional law, 
policymakers within particular fields not only seem to have enrolled in the 
course, but have also been active participants. 
Second, in response to the critique that Court-as-educator theories lack 
any evidentiary support, this Article provides detailed accounts of how the 
Court’s opinions in Buck, Gobitis, and Belton imparted bad constitutional 
lessons. Examined from the perspective of the Court’s actual pupils, these ill-
fated opinions can be understood to stimulate learning, emulating, and 
extrapolating that resulted in the contested measures becoming more 
widespread. Although this terminology will be developed further below, a 
brief word of exposition is required here.24 By learning, I mean that the 
Court’s opinions elevated the measures’ profiles and, in the process, informed 
some policymakers what measures would be deemed to pass constitutional 
muster. By emulating, I mean that some policymakers implemented the 
measures validated by the Court’s opinion because those measures had 
received the Supreme Court’s imprimatur. By extrapolating, I mean that some 
 
624, 642 (1943) (reversing Gobitis); Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 349-51 (2009) (reversing Belton in 
substance if not in form). 
21 Buck, 247 U.S. 200; see infra notes 57–60 and accompanying text. 
22 Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586; see infra notes 90–98 and accompanying text. 
23 Belton, 453 U.S. 454; see infra notes 117–21 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra text accompanying notes 131–42. 
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policymakers seized the undergirding logic of the Court’s opinions and drew 
inferences to apply that logic in uncharted terrain. 
This terminology incorporates—and elaborates upon—the voluminous 
political science scholarship exploring the phenomenon it labels “policy 
diffusion.”25 In this work stretching back to the late 1960s, political scientists 
have examined how policies spread both domestically (from one state to other 
states) and internationally (from one nation to other nations).26 While some 
professors have also deployed the insights of policy diffusion in legal 
scholarship, they have tended to examine the phenomenon in relatively 
isolated contexts by, for example, scrutinizing how legal regimes spread from 
one municipal government to other municipal governments,27 one state 
legislature to other state legislatures,28 from one state court system to other 
state court systems,29 and from one country to other countries.30 Yet law 
review articles exploring federalism and local experimentation have 
increasingly adopted the policy diffusion framework.31 Somewhat oddly, then, 
 
25 Although political scientists have previously used the terms “learning” and “emulating,” this 
Article introduces the term “extrapolating” to the policy diffusion literature. 
26 The political science literature on policy diffusion has itself grown remarkably diffuse. For 
only a few of the foundational works in this area, see Jack L. Walker, Jr., The Diffusion of Innovations 
Among the American States, 63 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 880 (1969); Virginia Gray, Innovation in the States: 
A Diffusion Study, 67 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1174 (1973); Frances Stokes Berry & William D. Berry, 
Innovation and Diffusion Models in Policy Research, in THEORIES OF THE POLICY PROCESS 253 
(Christopher M. Weible & Paul A. Sabatier eds., 4th ed. 2018); and Michael Mintrom, Policy 
Entrepreneurs and the Diffusion of Innovation, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 738 (1997). For overviews of the 
voluminous policy diffusion literatures, see Erin R. Graham, Charles R. Shipan & Craig Volden, 
The Diffusion of Policy Diffusion Research in Political Science, 43 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 673 (2012), and 
Charles R. Shipan & Craig Volden, Policy Diffusion: Seven Lessons for Scholars and Practitioners, 72 
PUB. ADMIN. REV. 788 (2012). 
27 See Olatunde C.A. Johnson, The Local Turn; Innovation and Diffusion in Civil Rights Law, 79 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 115, 117, 137-40 (2016). 
28 See David E. Adelman & Kristin H. Engel, Reorienting State Climate Change Policies to Induce 
Technological Change, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 835, 845-46 (2008); Barak Y. Orbach, Kathleen S. Callahan 
& Lisa M. Lindemenn, Arming States’ Rights: Federalism, Private Lawmakers, and the Battering Ram 
Strategy, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 1161, 1168-69 (2010). 
29 See Shane A. Gleason & Robert M. Howard, State Supreme Courts and Shared Networking: 
The Diffusion of Education Policy, 78 ALB. L. REV. 1485, 1485-86 (2015); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. 
Sunstein, The Law of Other States, 59 STAN. L. REV. 131, 139-40 (2006); William B. Turner, The 
Lesbian De Facto Parent Standard in Holtzmann v. Knott: Judicial Policy Innovation and Diffusion, 22 
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 135, 154 (2007). 
30 See KATERINA LINOS, THE DEMOCRATIC FOUNDATIONS OF POLICY DIFFUSION: HOW 
HEALTH, FAMILY AND EMPLOYMENT LAWS SPREAD ACROSS COUNTRIES 2 (2013); RYAN 
GOODMAN & DEREK JINKS, SOCIALIZING STATES: PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-2 (2013). 
31 For an important, illuminating article that emphasizes the downside of policy diffusion, with 
particular applications to the world of environmental law, see Michael A. Livermore, The Perils of 
Experimentation, 126 YALE L.J. 636, 636-708 (2017); and see also Michael Burger, The 
(Re)Federalization of Fracking Regulation, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1483, 1488; Brian Galle & Joseph 
Leahy, Laboratories of Democracy? Policy Innovation in Decentralized Governments, 58 EMORY L.J. 1333, 
 
2021] The Supreme Court as Bad Teacher 1373 
legal scholarship has yet to examine policy diffusion in a conspicuous setting: 
how Supreme Court opinions validating state and local measures can prompt 
other states and localities to adopt those measures. In uncovering the 
Supreme Court’s underappreciated role in spreading policies throughout the 
nation, this Article employs an approach it terms integrated policy diffusion. 
Rather than examining how policies spread within only a single governmental 
sphere (i.e., from state legislature to state legislature, from state court to state 
court, or from nation to nation) as is traditional, an integrated approach to 
policy diffusion requires examining how policies spread due to the dynamic 
interaction of governmental entities across multiple spheres. As the bad 
teaching moments in Buck, Gobitis, and Belton demonstrate, Supreme Court 
opinions have led policies to become more widely adopted in a variety of 
governmental contexts: from statehouses to schoolhouses to police 
stationhouses. This less partitioned, more holistic approach to policy 
diffusion offers insight into not only how Supreme Court opinions actually 
operate, but into how legal institutions interact more broadly. 
Examining the Supreme Court’s teaching from this unconventional 
vantage point—where the Court has taught badly—has the additional virtue 
of better positioning scholars to glimpse instances when the Supreme Court 
has taught well. Just as the Court teaches badly when it aids constitutionally 
undesirable policies in becoming more widespread by issuing opinions that 
validate those policies, the Court can be viewed as teaching well when it leads 
constitutionally desirable policies to become more widespread by issuing 
opinions that validate those policies. Thus, in Ginsberg v. New York, the 
Supreme Court taught well by upholding a variable obscenity statute that was 
drawn in very narrow terms, making it clear what sorts of pornographic 
materials could be sold to adults without incident but were prohibited from 
being sold to minors.32 Accordingly, when many jurisdictions utilized New 
York’s measure as a model statute for their own variable obscenity legislation 
after Ginsberg, they also enacted narrowly drawn measures that imposed 
minimal burdens on the freedom of expression.33 The Ginsberg lesson has 
proved lasting as the Court has never retreated from the decision, and the 
variable obscenity measures it inspired remain in place today. In addition, the 
Supreme Court can be viewed as teaching well when it engages in the 
opposite of policy diffusion: by invalidating ill-conceived, unconstitutional 
 
1338-39 (2009); Doni Gewirtzman, Complex Experimental Federalism, 63 BUFF. L. REV. 241, 254 
(2015) (applying policy diffusion methods in a study of experimental federalism); Aziz Z. Huq, Does 
the Logic of Collective Action Explain Federalism Doctrine?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 217, 261 (2014); Hannah 
J. Wiseman, Regulatory Islands, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1661, 1666-67 (2014); and Hannah J. Wiseman & 
Dave Owen, Federal Laboratories of Democracy, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1119, 1144 (2018). 
32 See 390 U.S. 629, 631-33 (1968). 
33 See infra text accompanying notes 245–55. 
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measures found in states and localities, a practice this article labels policy 
suppression. When it deems certain measures beyond the nation’s 
constitutional bounds, the Court transmits the important lesson that—even 
if majorities wish to enact particular measures—those measures may 
nevertheless be impermissible. This practice of suppressing unconstitutional 
measures, of course, accounts for many of the Court’s finest moments in its 
history, ranging from Loving v. Virginia’s invalidation of interracial marriage 
bans34 to Romer v. Evans’s invalidation of a statewide effort to exclude sexual 
orientation from the reach of local antidiscrimination laws.35 The Court’s 
lessons in these cases—and many others besides—have also proved durable, 
as the institution has stood by and reaffirmed the suppression of such 
unconstitutional policies. 
Understanding that the Supreme Court can meaningfully be viewed as 
teaching—both for worse and for better—not only fortifies the much-
maligned educational metaphor, but it also recasts high-profile legal debates 
within the modern era. First, contrary to leading academic theories asserting 
that the Court interprets the Constitution merely to amplify the nation’s 
consensus beliefs, highlighting the Court’s teaching capacity makes clear that 
the Justices often possess more latitude to issue a wide range of opinions than 
such theories allow. Although consensus-based theories suggest scholars 
ignore historical context when they either celebrate or condemn judicial 
opinions from earlier eras, the existence of judicial latitude demonstrates the 
propriety of criticizing the Court for teaching badly and of commending it 
for teaching well. Second, contrary to influential theories suggesting social 
reform movements should avoid litigation in favor of legislation, recovering 
the Court’s teaching role accentuates the fact that victories in the judicial 
arena sometimes transfer into the legislative arena. The Supreme Court’s 
ample teaching capacity establishes that claims holding the Court is too 
fragile an institution to play a significant role in shaping society must be 
reassessed. Finally, reclaiming the Court-as-teacher notion should not be 
dismissed as a project that is divorced from law’s substance; rather, as 
Supreme Court Justices and prominent law professors have repeatedly 
recognized, legal metaphors matter precisely because they influence and 
inform substantive legal outcomes.36 
The balance of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides the 
background details establishing that the Supreme Court taught badly by 
issuing opinions that aided the spread of measures authorizing compulsory 
sterilizations, compulsory flag salutes, and warrantless vehicle searches. Part 
 
34 See 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
35 See 517 U.S. 620, 635-36 (1996). 
36 See infra text accompanying notes 301–13. 
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II demonstrates how the Court’s opinions in Buck, Gobitis, and Belton can all 
be construed as having stimulated policymakers to learn, emulate, and 
extrapolate lessons from those opinions. With the Court’s potential for bad 
teaching established, Part III then pivots to reconceive how the Court might 
be considered a good teacher, illustrating how the Court has both boosted 
measures that promote constitutional values and suppressed measures that 
damage constitutional values. Turning to consider implications, Part IV 
evaluates how reconceiving the Court as a teacher complicates prominent 
theories within modern legal scholarship that offer unduly anemic views of 
the judiciary’s capacity to shape society, and also highlights the significance 
of metaphors within legal discourse. A brief conclusion follows. 
Before delving into the argument further, it is necessary to provide two 
explanatory notes. First, my selection of judicial opinions to illustrate the 
Court teaching badly and teaching admirably involves both descriptive and 
normative elements. As to the descriptive element, the opinions analyzed 
herein all comport with what can be deemed the Supreme Court’s own, 
ongoing assessment of whether its opinions embodied bad lessons or good 
lessons. The opinions exemplifying bad teaching all witnessed the Court 
subsequently reverse or dramatically retreat from those precedents, 
suggesting that those earlier decisions contained incorrect substantive views. 
The opinions exemplifying good teaching, moreover, have all witnessed the 
Court stand steadfast by those precedents, suggesting that those decisions 
contained correct substantive views. As to the normative element, the 
opinions I have selected to exemplify bad teaching and good teaching also 
comport with my own constitutional understandings. These normative 
constitutional commitments are in no way idiosyncratic. To the contrary, each 
of them is reflected in current constitutional doctrine. Still, it seems advisable 
to acknowledge in a forthright manner that what makes for “bad” and “good” 
constitutional teaching unmistakably involves normativity. 
The second explanatory note addresses the limited scope of my claim 
regarding the Court’s capacity for teaching. While the opinions analyzed 
herein are illustrative rather than exhaustive of the Court’s educational 
function, I am in no way contending that the Court’s opinions invariably teach 
lessons. My ambitions here are more modest; I aim to demonstrate merely 
that the Court sometimes, both for ill and for good, has in fact taught.37 For 
the Court to teach effectively, segments of the public must be at least 
somewhat receptive to the lessons it imparts. Of course, to the extent that 
this statement suggests only that, in order for the Court to teach, underlying 
 
37 Cf. Eisgruber, supra note 3, at 965 (“[T]he Court teaches only rarely.”); id. at 1002 (“The 
Court teaches part-time—in fact, rarely—if at all.”). 
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conditions must be conducive to that endeavor, it is a statement that teachers 
in actual classrooms across the nation would heartily endorse. 
I. BACKGROUND 
This Part identifies and explores four successive background phases 
indicating that the Supreme Court has potentially acted as a bad teacher. 
First, legal uncertainty clouds what policies governmental entities may adopt 
to address a particular concern without violating the Constitution. Second, 
the Supreme Court eliminates this uncertainty by issuing an opinion that 
validates the constitutionality of a particular policy. Third, the Court-
validated policy spreads throughout the nation.38 Fourth, the Supreme Court 
reverses course in an area by either overturning its prior decision outright or 
dramatically retreating from its earlier opinion. This Part chronicles each of 
these four successive stages with respect to three different legal controversies: 
compulsory sterilization, flag salute requirements, and warrantless searches 
of vehicles upon arresting occupants. 
A. Sterilizations 
When the Supreme Court weighed the constitutionality of Virginia’s 
compulsory sterilization law in Buck v. Bell in 1927, it did so against a legal 
backdrop that cast substantial doubt on the permissibility of such measures.39 
Although the eugenics movement succeeded in convincing several state 
legislatures to pass sterilization bills during the early twentieth century, those 
successes almost always proved ephemeral. Governors in at least five states 
vetoed sterilization bills, and courts in at least seven additional states 
invalidated sterilization statutes, citing various legal infirmities.40 Even in 
states where compulsory sterilization technically remained available on the 
books, physicians performed very few such surgeries because the nebulous 
 
38 Focusing upon measures that become more widespread after the Supreme Court issues an 
opinion validating the measure results in some cases being excluded from examination that may 
seem to cry out for treatment in an article examining bad constitutional teaching at the Supreme 
Court. To take one example, the Court validated antisodomy statutes in Bowers v. Hardwick in 1986, 
and then reversed course in Lawrence v. Texas seventeen years later. Bowers is surely one of the most 
reviled opinions that the Supreme Court has issued in recent decades and might be presumed an 
ideal candidate for treatment in this project. Nevertheless, the Court’s opinion in Bowers—odious 
though it was—did not result in more states enacting antisodomy statutes. To the contrary, after 
Bowers, many states rejected their existing antisodomy provisions; twenty-five states had antisodomy 
provisions in 1986, and only thirteen states retained those measures when the Court decided 
Lawrence in 2003. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003). 
39 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
40 See WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 6 (1995). 
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legal environment led both surgeons and institutional administrators alike to 
fear criminal prosecution.41 The lone exception to this trend was California, 
which accounted for the majority of sterilization procedures before the late-
1920s.42 According to leading historians of sterilization, this state of affairs 
left the sterilization movement “hobbled”43 and “frustrated at the legal 
impasse.”44 Before the Court issued Buck, both proponents and opponents of 
compulsory sterilization detected signs that the movement was flagging.45 By 
1923, one observer concluded: “[E]ugenical sterilization laws are gradually 
losing interest for the public, and to some extent at least for professed 
eugenicists.”46 In 1926, just one year before the Court’s opinion in Buck, 
Clarence Darrow dismissed compulsory sterilization proponents as a “cult” of 
“irresponsible fanatics.”47 
In Buck, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s opinion for the Court, joined 
by seven other justices, suggested that rumors of the sterilization movement’s 
demise had been greatly exaggerated.48 Carrie Buck, a patient in a state-run 
institution for the “feeble minded,” challenged Virginia’s authority to sterilize 
her under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses.49 In upholding the statute, Justice Holmes emphasized the elaborate 
procedural mechanisms that Virginia imposed before an involuntary 
sterilization could occur. In addition to providing targeted individuals and 
their guardians with notice, Virginia’s statute required a hearing to be held 
(where all evidence would be reduced to writing), and also afforded multiple 
opportunities for appeal.50 Such “very careful provisions by which the act 
protects the patient from possible abuse,” Holmes wrote, discharged 
Virginia’s Due Process obligations.51 Holmes made short work of Buck’s Equal 
Protection claim—which noted the law applied exclusively to residents of 
certain state institutions, not to the population at large—by deriding it as “the 
 
41 See VICTORIA F. NOURSE, IN RECKLESS HANDS: SKINNER V. OKLAHOMA AND THE NEAR 
TRIUMPH OF AMERICAN EUGENICS 24 (2008). 
42 See EDWARD J. LARSON, SEX, RACE, AND SCIENCE: EUGENICS IN THE DEEP SOUTH 119 (1995). 
43 Id. at 28. 
44 DANIEL J. KEVLES, IN THE NAME OF EUGENICS: GENETICS AND THE USES OF HUMAN 
HEREDITY 110 (1985). 
45 See id. 
46 Paul Popenoe, Eugenical Sterilization: A Review, 14 J. HEREDITY 308, 310 (1923). 
47 Clarence Darrow, The Eugenics Cult, 8 AM. MERCURY 129, 137 (1926); see J.B. Eggen, 
Eugenics Teaching Imperils Civilization, 24 CURRENT HIST. 882, 882 (1926) (referring to compulsory 
sterilization proponents as a “small sect”). 
48 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). Justice Butler dissented, but he did not write an 
opinion to explain his view. Id. at 208. 
49 See id. at 205. 
50 Id. at 205-06. 
51 Id. at 206. 
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usual last resort of constitutional arguments.”52 In his extrajudicial writings 
prior to Buck, Holmes expressed the hearty support for eugenics that was 
common among Progressives.53 It comes as little surprise, then, that Holmes’s 
eugenics enthusiasm appeared on the face of Buck itself. Holmes did not 
uphold Virginia’s statute by offering his characteristic odes to judicial 
restraint and democratic deference. Instead, Holmes endorsed sterilization as 
a desirable policy “to prevent our being swamped with incompetence.”54 
Holmes continued: “It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to 
execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their 
imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from 
continuing their kind.”55 Drawing upon findings that both Buck’s mother and 
young daughter were also mentally deficient, Holmes famously distilled his 
support for sterilization into a sentence containing a mere six devastating 
words: “Three generations of imbeciles are enough.”56 
Writing in the wake of Buck, J.H. Landman—a prominent 
contemporaneous student of sterilization—predicted that sterilization would 
become more widespread: “With such official sanction it will not be long 
before many states will enact similar legislation.”57 Landman’s prediction 
proved accurate in short order, as a flurry of legislative activity followed Buck. 
As the authors of a comprehensive analysis of compulsory sterilization laws 
explained in 2013: “Buck v. Bell opened the floodgates. With the green light 
to eugenic sterilization provided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1927, almost 
thirty American states either initiated or consolidated their own legislation 
on coerced sterilization.”58 Apart from this surge in legislation, moreover, the 
number of compulsory sterilizations performed nationally per year increased 
dramatically after Buck, peaking in the 1930s at nearly ten times the number 
 
52 Id. at 208. For an insightful critique of Justice Holmes’s misleading account of the Supreme 
Court’s Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence, see Stephen A. Siegel, Justice Holmes, Buck v. Bell, 
and the History of Equal Protection, 90 MINN. L. REV. 106 (2005). 
53 See NOURSE, supra note 41, at 30-31. 
54 Buck, 274 U.S. at 207; see Oliver Wendell Holmes, Ideals and Doubts, 10 ILL. L. REV. 1, 3 
(1915) (noting that “trying to build a race” was his “starting point for an ideal for the law”). For more 
evidence of Holmes’s support for eugenics, see G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL 
HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER SELF 407-08, 572 n.135 (1993). 
55 Buck, 274 U.S. at 207. 
56 Id. The findings of mental deficiency that Holmes relied upon to classify the Bucks 
“imbeciles” turned out to be erroneous in all three instances. See generally PAUL A. LOMBARDO, 
THREE GENERATIONS, NO IMBECILES: EUGENICS, THE SUPREME COURT, AND BUCK V. BELL 
(2008). For a compelling account of Buck v. Bell that is aimed at a general audience, see ADAM 
COHEN, IMBECILES: THE SUPREME COURT, AMERICAN EUGENICS, AND THE STERILIZATION 
OF CARRIE BUCK (2017). 
57 J.H. Landman, The History of Human Sterilization in the United States—Theory, Statute, 
Adjudication, 23 ILL. L. REV. 463, 464 (1929). 
58 See RANDALL HANSEN & DESMOND KING, STERILIZED BY THE STATE: EUGENICS, 
RACE, AND THE POPULATION SCARE IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY NORTH AMERICA 117 (2013). 
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performed just a few years earlier.59 With doubts regarding the 
constitutionality of sterilization statutes erased, state administrators became 
less hesitant about ordering the operations and physicians became more 
comfortable performing them.60 
Finally, the Court’s opinion in Skinner v. Oklahoma in 1942 represented a 
dramatic retreat from the pro-sterilization message it communicated fifteen 
years earlier in Buck.61 In Skinner, the Court assessed the constitutionality of 
a measure that would sterilize criminal offenders upon their third felony 
conviction for crimes of moral turpitude. The Oklahoma legislature enacted 
the statute on the eugenics-based justification that crime, like feeble-
mindedness, was hereditary.62 Justice William Douglas’s opinion for the 
Court invalidated the Oklahoma measure, holding that its uneven designation 
of crimes involving moral turpitude violated the Equal Protection Clause.63 
Skinner, to be sure, did not formally overrule Buck.64 Indeed, some passages 
in Skinner appear to hold out the possibility that the two opinions are 
somehow compatible.65 Nevertheless, the opinions contain profoundly 
conflicting views of compulsory sterilization measures. Skinner’s opening 
sentences capture the sharp tonal shift in the Court’s attitude toward 
sterilization from Buck: “This case touches a sensitive and important area of 
human rights. Oklahoma deprives certain individuals of a right which is basic 
to the perpetuation of a race—the right to have offspring.”66 Although Buck 
involved precisely the same basic right, one would search Justice Holmes’s 
opinion in vain for such allowances. The Court’s marked shift in its attitude 
toward compulsory sterilization is further evident from Skinner’s 
announcement that it would apply “strict scrutiny” to review sterilization 
legislation.67 Skinner’s application of “strict scrutiny,” the first time that phrase 
 
59 See LARSON, supra note 42, at 28. 
60 See HANSEN & KING, supra note 58, at 115. For a discussion of Buck, the opinion’s political 
consequences, and the federalism dynamics surrounding the eugenics movement, see JEFFREY S. 
SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 4-5, 84-120 (2018) (“The aftermath of Buck demonstrates what happens if 
Americans rely too heavily on just one of those courts, the U.S. Supreme Court, as the exclusive 
guardian of our rights . . . .”). 
61 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
62 See Brief for Respondent at 5, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (No. 782). 
63 See 316 U.S. at 541-42 (noting the statutory oddity that common theft involved moral 
turpitude, but that embezzlement did not). 
64 See SUTTON, supra note 60, at 124 (noting Skinner undermined the eugenics movement even 
though it “left Buck on the books”). 
65 See 316 U.S. at 542 (suggesting compatibility with Buck). 
66 Id. at 536. For similar views in Skinner, see id. at 541 (“We are dealing here with legislation 
which involves one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the 
very existence and survival of the race.”). 
67 Id. 
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ever appeared in the U.S. Reports, can be understood as replacing Buck’s 
gentle glance.68 Where Justice Holmes in Buck emphasized how much society 
stood to benefit from compulsory sterilization, Justice Douglas in Skinner 
highlighted how much both society and the individual targeted for 
sterilization stood to lose from such legislation. “The power to sterilize, if 
exercised, may have subtle, far reaching and devastating effects,” Justice 
Douglas wrote. “In evil or reckless hands it can cause races or types which are 
inimical to the dominant group to wither and disappear. There is no 
redemption for the individual whom the law touches . . . . He is forever 
deprived of a basic liberty.”69 Skinner did not immediately eliminate all 
compulsory sterilization in the United States, but it cannot be understood as 
signaling anything less than a sea-change in the Court’s assessment of the 
wisdom contained in such legislation.70 
B. Salutes 
When the Supreme Court decided Minersville School District v. Gobitis in 
1940, at least some ambiguity surrounded whether the Constitution permitted 
public schools to expel students for refusing to salute the American flag.71 The 
issue arose because Jehovah’s Witnesses felt that participating in the flag 
salute ceremony violated a biblical commandment, and accordingly they 
argued that salute mandates hindered their First Amendment free exercise 
rights.72 During the five-year period prior to Gobitis, Jehovah’s Witnesses 
litigated the issue repeatedly around the country, but sustained a series of 
lower court defeats.73 The Supreme Court consistently refused to hear oral 
argument in these cases, in effect permitting the expulsions to stand.74 Some 
courts before Gobitis did, however, hold that flag salute requirements violated 
the constitutional rights of Jehovah’s Witnesses. In 1937, an intermediate 
court in California vindicated the constitutional claim in the first favorable 
written opinion on the flag salute issue.75 But the California Supreme Court 
reversed that opinion one year later.76 That same year, though, a federal 
 
68 NOURSE, supra note 41, at 152 (observing Skinner’s innovation). 
69 Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541. 
70 See NOURSE, supra note 41, at 158-59 (assessing Skinner’s legacy). 
71 310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
72 See Exodus 20:3-5 (King James) (“Thou shalt have no other gods before me. Thou shalt not 
make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of anything that is in heaven above . . . [and t]hou 
shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them . . . .”). 
73 See DAVID R. MANWARING, RENDER UNTO CAESAR: THE FLAG SALUTE CONTROVERSY 
56-80 (1962). 
74 See id. 
75 Gabrielli v. Knickerbocker, 74 P.2d 290 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1937), rev’d, Gabrielli v. 
Knickerbocker, 82 P.2d 391 (Cal. 1938). 
76 Gabrielli, 82 P.2d 391. 
2021] The Supreme Court as Bad Teacher 1381 
district court judge in Pennsylvania determined that a local school district 
could not expel Jehovah’s Witnesses without violating the First 
Amendment.77 In 1939, a unanimous panel on the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s opinion.78 During this pre-
Gobitis era, furthermore, major law reviews published items casting 
considerable doubt on the constitutionality of permitting schools to expel 
students for refusing to salute the flag.79 The legality of flag salute 
requirements was sufficiently hazy prior to Gobitis that the Attorney General 
of Washington State ordered school officials to refrain from expelling non-
saluting students who cited their religious scruples.80 
In Gobitis, Justice Felix Frankfurter’s opinion for the Court upheld the 
constitutionality of public schools that expelled students for failing to salute 
the American flag.81 Unusually close readers of Gobitis may have noticed that 
Justice Frankfurter appeared to evince at least some skepticism regarding the 
wisdom of imposing flag-salute requirements on all students. As Frankfurter 
expressed the point obliquely: “For ourselves, we might be tempted to say 
that the deepest patriotism is best engendered by giving unfettered scope to 
the most crotchety beliefs. Perhaps it is best . . . to give to the least popular 
sect leave from conformities like those here in issue.”82 Whatever temptation 
the Justices experienced in Gobitis, Frankfurter explained, they resisted 
because questions of this sort belonged to educators, not judges.83 Apart from 
a few isolated passages, though, Frankfurter’s opinion generally reads as 
though it endorses flag salute requirements because of the colossal importance 
of fostering national cohesion. “We are dealing with an interest inferior to 
none in the hierarchy of legal values,” Frankfurter explained.84 “National 
unity is the basis of national security.”85 Frankfurter received the assignment 
to write Gobitis because of the zealous appeal to patriotism that he delivered 
in conference.86 That zeal was on full display in Gobitis, as he deemed national 
 
77 Gobitis v. Minersville, 24 F. Supp. 271 (E.D. Pa. 1938). 
78 Minersville v. Gobitis, 108 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1939). 
79 See, e.g., Note, Compulsory Flag Salutes and Religious Freedom, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1418 (1938); 
Recent Case, Power of the School Board to Compel Pupils to Salute Flag, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 431 (1938). 
80 See MANWARING, supra note 73, at 188. 
81 Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
82 Id. at 598. 
83 See id. (“[T]he courtroom is not the arena for debating issues of educational policy.”); id. 
(invalidating the measure “would in effect make us the school board for the country”); id. at 597-98 
(contending that, in the field of education, “courts possess no marked and certainly no controlling 
competence”). For a claim that public schools have served as the preeminent site of constitutional 
interpretation, see DRIVER, supra note 15, at 9. 
84 Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 595. 
85 Id. 
86 See ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 284 (2d ed. 1997); Brad Snyder, 
Frankfurter and Popular Constitutionalism, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 343, 374 n.188 (2013). 
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cohesion “[t]he ultimate foundation of a free society,” and a link between 
generations that creates “a treasured common life which constitutes a 
civilization.”87 Building on this rhetorical crescendo, Frankfurter proceeded 
to quote a favorite statement from his judicial hero, Justice Holmes. “‘We live 
by symbols,’” Frankfurter wrote.88 “The flag is the symbol of our national 
unity, transcending all internal differences, however large, within the 
framework of the Constitution.”89 Given these sorts of sweeping 
proclamations, it might have seemed not merely constitutionally permissible 
but necessary for school authorities to introduce flag salute requirements. 
Following Gobitis, the practice of expelling Jehovah’s Witness students for 
refusing to salute the American flag spread throughout the entire country.90 
In 1940, the year Gobitis was decided, students in fifteen different states either 
had been or were in the process of being expelled due to the saluting 
controversy.91 Just three years later, though, expulsions had occurred in every 
one of the nation’s forty-eight states.92 Some of these expulsions could be 
traced to the adoption of post-Gobitis measures enacted by state legislatures, 
state boards of education, municipal governments, and local school boards.93 
Other expulsions were attributable not to new statutes, but instead to novel, 
more aggressive interpretations of extant statutes.94 Predictably, the overall 
number of flag-related expulsions also skyrocketed after Gobitis.95 David 
Manwaring, a leading authority on the Court’s flag salute cases, has noted 
that the “[m]ost immediately striking” aspect of the five-year period before 
Gobitis “is the relatively small number of total expulsions.”96 Manwaring does 
not provide a precise number of expulsions, but he does disclose that only 
two states during this era expelled more than ten students.97 By 1943, 
 
87 Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 596; see also E.D. HIRSCH, THE ENIGMA OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 131 
(1981) (noting Frankfurter’s obsession with Holmes); BRAD SNYDER, THE HOUSE OF TRUTH: 
A WASHINGTON SALON AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM 24 (2017) 
(noting the high esteem in which Frankfurter held Holmes). 
88 Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 596. 
89 Id. 
90 See Francis H. Heller, A Turning Point for Religious Liberty, 29 VA. L. REV. 440, 449 (1943) (“This 
decision was followed by almost countrywide enactment of flag salute statutes and rules . . . .”). 
91 See MANWARING, supra note 73, at 187. 
92 See id. 
93 See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 629 (1943) (analyzing a state board of 
education measure adopted after Gobitis at the direction of the state legislature); Zavilla v. Masse, 
147 P.2d 823 (Colo. 1944) (analyzing a measure adopted by the school board); In re Jones, 24 N.Y.S.2d 
10 (N.Y. Child.’s Ct. 1940) (analyzing a city resolution adopted after Gobitis). 
94 See State v. LeFebvre, 20 A.2d 185, 186 (N.H. 1941) (analyzing a Jehovah’s Witness expulsion 
on the basis of a measure that antedated Gobitis). 
95 See Heller, supra note 90, at 449 (observing “an increased number of expulsions upon 
reopening of the schools” post-Gobitis). 
96 See MANWARING, supra note 73, at 79. 
97 See id. 
2021] The Supreme Court as Bad Teacher 1383 
Manwaring notes that the number of flag-related expulsions had ballooned to 
exceed more than two thousand students, giving each of the forty-eight states 
an average of more than forty expulsions.98 
In 1943, after the compulsory flag salute requirements spread nationally, 
the Supreme Court explicitly reversed course, overturning the measures in 
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette.99 At times, Justice Robert 
Jackson’s opinion for the Court amounts to a point-by-point rebuttal of 
Gobitis. Where Justice Frankfurter had emphasized the limits of judicial 
knowledge within the educational arena, Justice Jackson emphasized that 
“modest estimates of our competence in . . . public education” should not lead 
the Court to abdicate its constitutional responsibilities.100 Jackson further 
insisted, contra Frankfurter, that threats could not foster national cohesion: 
“[F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That 
would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to 
differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order.”101 Next, Jackson 
laid his own claim to the mantle of patriotism by suggesting that requirements 
to salute the American flag were themselves, in a very real sense, un-
American.102 “If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it 
is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in 
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to 
confess by word or act their faith therein,” Jackson wrote.103 From a doctrinal 
perspective, Justice Jackson’s most important contribution in Barnette lay in 
his reconceptualization of the harm Jehovah’s Witnesses sought to avoid in 
resisting compulsory flag salute measures. Instead of conceiving the measures 
as primarily inhibiting the First Amendment’s freedom of religion, Justice 
Jackson instead focused on how the measures constrained the First 
Amendment’s freedom of expression. By forcing Jehovah’s Witnesses to 
salute the American flag upon penalty of expulsion, Jackson reasoned, the 
state impeded their freedom of speech, which involves a corresponding right 
not to speak.104 But whatever Barnette’s precise constitutional reasoning, the 
 
98 See id. at 187. 
99 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
100 Id. at 640. 
101 Id. at 642. 
102 This portion of Barnette maps onto Philip Bobbitt’s “ethical” modality of constitutional 
interpretation. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 
93-119 (1982) (explaining that arguments from ethos appeal to constitutive claims about the nation 
and its traditions). 
103 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642. This statement is among the most luminous, most powerful in the 
Court’s entire history. 
104 See id. at 634 (“To sustain the compulsory flag salute we are required to say that a Bill of Rights 
which guards the individual’s right to speak his own mind, left it open to public authorities to compel 
him to utter what is not in his mind.”). For a helpful examination of constitutional rights and their 
negative corresponding rights, see Joseph Blocher, Rights To and Not To, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 761 (2012). 
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opinion prohibited public schools across the country from expelling Jehovah’s 
Witnesses for adhering to their religious principles. 
C. Searches 
When the Supreme Court decided New York v. Belton in 1981, considerable 
confusion attended the question of how extensively the Fourth Amendment 
permitted police officers lacking a warrant to search an automobile when lawfully 
arresting one of its occupants.105 Twelve years earlier, in Chimel v. California, the 
Court held that an officer who arrests someone inside a home could not proceed to 
search the house in its entirety, but instead was limited to searching the arrestee 
and the area “within his immediate control.”106 Chimel defined that phrase to mean 
“the area from within which [the arrestee] might gain possession of a weapon or 
destructible evidence.”107 The importation of Chimel’s “immediate control” concept 
into the vehicle context raised two crucial questions for police departments, and 
ultimately for judges. First, does the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on 
unreasonable searches permit officers to search a vehicle’s entire passenger 
compartment when conducting an arrest? Second, does the answer to that first 
question hinge on the reason for the underlying arrest? During the twelve years 
between Chimel and Belton, lower courts answered those queries with a dizzying 
range of responses. Some courts gave officers free rein to search a car’s passenger 
compartment when conducting an arrest.108 Other courts, in contrast, concluded 
that searching a car pursuant to an arrest violated the Fourth Amendment.109 Still 
other courts concluded the Fourth Amendment prohibited officers from searching 
a vehicle if the arresting offense involved a garden-variety traffic violation, 
reasoning that there would be no basis for believing that a search in those 
circumstances would uncover a weapon or evidence of another crime.110 In sum, as 
 
105 453 U.S. 454 (1981). 
106 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). 
107 Id. 
108 See, e.g., United States v. Sanders, 631 F.2d 1309 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v. Dixon, 
558 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1977). 
109 See, e.g., United States v. Benson, 631 F.2d 1336 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v. Rigales, 
630 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1980). One article surveyed the legal landscape of these circuits, and described 
it as a majority rule: 
After Chimel, once an arrestee has left the car and is under control, it would not 
ap[p]ear that the vehicle is within his immediate control any more than the bedroom 
of an individual who was arrested in his living room is within that individual’s 
immediate control. Most courts agree that a car may not be searched incident to arrest 
after . . . the arrestee has been removed from the vehicle. 
Richard L. Allen & John A. Schaefer, Great Expectations: Privacy Rights in Automobiles, 34 U. MIAMI 
L. REV. 99, 132 (1979). 
110 See V.A. LEONARD, THE POLICE, THE JUDICIARY, AND THE CRIMINAL 72 (1969) (“A 
number of case decisions indicate that the officer has no right to search either the occupants of a car 
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the Court in Belton would eventually concede, federal courts of appeals encountered 
serious “difficulty” applying Chimel’s standard to automobiles, and the state courts 
were “in similar disarray.”111 
In Belton, Justice Potter Stewart’s opinion for the Court sought to 
eliminate this confusion by articulating a bright-line rule authorizing police 
officers to conduct comprehensive searches of automobiles when they arrest 
an occupant.112 In reaching this conclusion, Justice Stewart explicitly invoked 
legal scholarship advising the Court to interpret the Fourth Amendment in a 
manner that provided clear guidance to police officers and thus avoided the 
need for making fact-sensitive determinations mired in ambiguity. Quoting 
extensively from an academic article, Stewart noted, “‘Fourth Amendment 
doctrine . . . is primarily intended to regulate the police in their day-to-day 
activities and thus ought to be expressed in terms that are readily applicable 
by the police.’”113 Accordingly, Stewart continued, Fourth Amendment 
opinions should eschew regulatory guidance “‘qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands, 
and buts,’” and that requires implementing officers to draw “‘subtle nuances 
and hairline distinctions.’”114 In an effort to craft “the workable rule this 
category of cases requires,” Justice Stewart wrote: “[W]e hold that when a 
policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an 
automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the 
passenger compartment of that automobile.”115 Belton proceeded to specify 
that this holding authorized arresting officers to search any container within 
the vehicle’s passenger compartment, including any articles or items within 
luggage and clothing.116 
After Belton, not surprisingly, the practice of police officers automatically 
conducting comprehensive warrantless searches of automobiles when they 
arrested an occupant spread throughout the nation. It is impossible to state 
with anything approaching precision how many police departments followed 
Belton-style protocol prior to 1981.117 Apart from the issue of aggregating the 
many disparate approaches, police departments tend not to publicize the 
 
or the car itself when the arrest is made for an ordinary traffic offense.”); LOUIS B. SCHWARTZ & 
STEPHEN R. GOLDSTEIN, LAW ENFORCEMENT HANDBOOK FOR POLICE 136 (1970) (warning 
police officers against searching an automobile when conducting an arrest for a traffic violation). 
111 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 459 & n.1 (1981). Belton demonstrated the federal 
judiciary’s difficulty in applying Chimel to cars by noting the deep divide that existed among the 
circuit courts. See id. at 459. 
112 See id. at 460. 
113 Id. at 458 (quoting Wayne R. LaFave, “Case-By-Case Adjudication” Versus “Standardized 
Procedures”: The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 127, 142). 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 451. 
116 See id. at 460 & n.4. Belton did, however, exclude searches of an automobile’s trunk. See id. 
117 See Myron Moskovitz, A Rule in Search of a Reason: An Empirical Reexamination of Chimel and Belton, 
2002 WIS. L. REV. 657, 663-67 (noting the myriad difficulties of surveying actual police practices). 
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contents of their training manuals, lest they fall into lawless hands.118 
Nonetheless, evidence supports the idea that Belton created a new status quo 
and did not merely memorialize the existing status quo. As the Court itself 
recognized, many jurisdictions understood Chimel to afford police far less 
latitude to conduct searches than Belton permitted.119 In contemporaneous 
commentary, moreover, the Washington Post deemed Belton “a major 
departure,”120 an assessment with which leading legal scholars appeared to 
agree. Law professors roundly excoriated Belton because they viewed the 
opinion as insufficiently protective of the privacy interests that animated 
Chimel, and because it could be understood as veritably inviting police officers 
to arrest motorists on pretextual grounds in order to engage in otherwise 
impermissible searches.121 Whatever the precise breakdown of police practices 
regarding automotive searches before Belton, it requires no great imagination 
to understand why the Belton rule would have become virtually universal in 
its wake. Police departments would have strong incentives to conform their 
training methods to align with Belton because the decision represented a 
powerful investigatory weapon in the law enforcement arsenal. 
Finally, twenty-eight years after Belton, the Court disavowed its bright-
line rule in Arizona v. Gant in 2009.122 In Gant, police officers arrested a 
motorist for driving with a suspended license, and then discovered cocaine 
and a firearm within the car when they conducted a Belton-style search.123 
Writing on behalf of the Court, Justice John Paul Stevens determined that 
the search violated the Fourth Amendment, and acknowledged criticism that 
Belton seemed to confer police officers with unfettered discretion to initiate 
exploratory searches.124 Adopting a case-by-case analysis, Justice Stevens held 
that arresting officers were permitted to search the entire passenger 
compartment provided they could reasonably conclude evidence related to 
the crime of arrest might be located in the automobile.125 “In many cases, as 
when a recent occupant is arrested for a traffic violation, there will be no 
 
118 See id. at 663. 
119 See supra text accompanying notes 108–11. 
120 Laura A. Kiernan, Court Outlines Ground Rules for Police in Searching Automobiles, WASH. 
POST (July 2, 1981), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1981/07/02/court-outlines-
ground-rules-for-police-in-searching-automobiles/2831fb5d-63bc-4a4f-8303-9210e5aff0a9 [https:// 
perma.cc/CU45-T7LB]. 
121 See Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 
227, 284-85 (1984) (“Belton converted this doctrine from a rule with a reason to a gratuity for a job 
well done.”). Even the law professor who Justice Stewart cited so extensively in Belton criticized the 
opinion. See Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing “Bright 
Lines” and “Good Faith,” 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 307, 332 (1982). 
122 See 556 U.S. 332 (2009). 
123 See id. at 336. 
124 See id. at 350-51. 
125 See id. at 346. 
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reasonable basis to believe the vehicle contains relevant evidence,” Justice 
Stevens wrote.126 “But in others . . . the offense of arrest will supply a basis 
for searching the passenger compartments of an arrestee’s vehicle and any 
containers therein.”127 Although Gant did not explicitly announce that it was 
overruling Belton, the opinion required police officers to engage in precisely the 
sort of fact-dependent inquiries that Belton had rejected, analysis predicated on 
“ifs, ands, and buts.”128 Legal commentators have thus widely concluded Gant 
“effectively overruled” Belton, even if it did not formally do so.129 
II. EXPLORATIONS 
This Part explores how the Supreme Court can be understood to have 
acted as a bad teacher in issuing Buck v. Bell, Minersville School District v. 
Gobitis, and New York v. Belton.130 In each case, the Supreme Court 
entertained a constitutional challenge to a contested practice, and issued an 
opinion affirming the practice’s validity. In so doing, the Court can be viewed 
as teaching badly by elevating the salience of a particular legal issue and 
assisting a misguided constitutional understanding to spread throughout the 
nation. The Court’s opinions in these three cases played a significant 
pedagogical role in stimulating various students to undertake various efforts 
that turned out to be misguided. On this conception, the Court’s students 
should not be construed as comprising the nation’s entire population, as 
Rostow posited, but instead as discrete subpopulations that pay careful 
attention to narrow aspects of the Court’s jurisprudence. 
This Part—which both extends and advances the phenomenon political 
scientists have labeled “policy diffusion”131—examines three distinct manners 
in which these students have utilized the Court’s bad teachings: learning, 
emulating, and extrapolating. Before delving into extended explanations of how 
 
126 Id. at 343. 
127 Id. at 344. 
128 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981) (internal quotation marks omitted). One of 
the reasons that Justice Stevens’s opinion in Gant may have sought to preserve rather than reject 
Belton could be owed to the fact that he joined the Belton majority in 1981, and he wished to preserve 
his reputation for voting consistently. For an argument that Justice Stevens and legal culture more 
broadly exhibit excessive concern with judicial consistency, see Justin Driver, Judicial Inconsistency as 
Virtue: The Case of Justice Stevens, 99 GEO. L.J. 1263 (2011). 
129 Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (with Particular Attention to Miranda v. 
Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1, 37 (2010); see also Craig M. Bradley, Is the Exclusionary Rule Dead?, 102 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 8 (2012) (“Belton was essentially overruled by Arizona v. Gant.”); 
Erik Luna, Hydraulic Pressures and Slight Deviations, 2009 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 133, 138 (contending 
Gant overruled Belton). 
130 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927); Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940); 
Belton, 453 U.S. 454. 
131 See supra text accompanying notes 25–26. 
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these three mechanisms appeared in the context of compulsory sterilization, 
flag salute mandates, and automobile searches, it is necessary to provide a 
theoretical overview of these phenomena, and to explain how they can 
profitably be applied to the Supreme Court’s role in American society. 
First, when students learn from a bad Supreme Court decision upholding 
a challenged practice, they comprehend what policies will pass constitutional 
muster.132 Political scientists, in the context of exploring how a policy spreads 
among states, have observed that when policymakers attempt to address a 
common problem they seek to avoid reinventing the wheel.133 Instead, 
policymakers survey the existing efforts to remedy the problem, and then 
select an approach that has proved successful in another state.134 Here, in the 
context of learning from Supreme Court opinions, the measure for deeming 
a policy “successful” boils down to whether the Court would validate a policy’s 
constitutionality. At the risk of stating the obvious in a paper emphasizing 
the Supreme Court’s penchant for bad teaching, policies that are adjudged 
successful in terms of constitutionality may well be deemed markedly, 
spectacularly unsuccessful when measured along other axes—including the 
capacity to promote fundamental values such as liberty, equality, and privacy. 
Stephen Wasby expressed a modest version of this learning point many years 
ago, when he wrote: “When the Court upholds a law, particularly one little 
used, lawyers may awaken to its possibilities.”135 This phenomenon, of course, 
cannot be confined to lawyers, as various Supreme Court opinions roused 
into action a range of groups including: state legislators, city council 
members, interest group activists, state hospital administrators, teachers, 
school administrators, and police officers.136 
 
132 Charels R. Shipan & Craig Volden, The Mechanisms of Policy Diffusion, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 
840, 841-42 (2008). 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 841. 
135 STEPHEN L. WASBY, THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 7 (1970). 
136 Some legal scholarship has suggested that citizens should be viewed as learning from 
Supreme Court opinions if they “changed their positions” on questions to follow the Court’s newly 
articulated view. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE 
SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 464 (2004). While this notion 
certainly presents a dramatic conception of learning from a judicial opinion, it is hardly the only 
notion that the term can be viewed as containing. Nor is this about-face notion of learning even 
necessarily the most obvious usage of that term. To appreciate the point, consider an example from 
the law school curriculum. When first-year students say that they learned the concept of 
consideration in contracts, it seems improbable that they mean to suggest that the instructor 
“changed their positions” on the concept. It seems likely that most students had no position on the 
concept of consideration one way or another. When students state that they learned consideration, 
they instead mean that they acquired new knowledge about what would be required to form an 
enforceable contract. This idea of learning—i.e., learning what works—is akin to the notion of 
learning—i.e., learning what is constitutional—employed in this Article. 
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Second, when students emulate the Supreme Court’s validation of a bad 
policy, they adopt a particular measure precisely because it conforms to a 
measure that has received endorsement from the nation’s highest Court.137 In 
the policy diffusion context, political scientists have observed that states 
sometimes adopt policies, not because they value those policies intrinsically, 
but because they admire a state that currently features the policy.138 It is 
helpful to understand this concept by contrasting the notion of emulating 
with that of learning.139 As political scientists have expressed that contrast: 
“The crucial distinction is that learning focuses on the action (i.e., the policy 
being adopted by another government), while [emulation] focuses on the actor 
(i.e., the other government that is adopting the policy).”140 Here, in 
considering emulation within the Court-as-educator analogy, the relevant 
actor held in high esteem is not some neighboring state or locality that has 
adopted a particular policy, but instead it is the Supreme Court itself, which 
as a revered institution has placed its imprimatur on that policy. Robert Dahl 
captured this emulation power well when he contended that “the most 
important” power the Supreme Court possesses “is the unique legitimacy 
attributed to its interpretations of the Constitution.”141 
Third, when students extrapolate from a bad Supreme Court decision, they 
take actions and form policies by making inferential leaps based upon their 
knowledge of the Court’s previous decision. In other words, to employ the 
mathematics terminology from which extrapolation borrows its moniker, 
students use a known data set to develop conjectural understandings of 
unknown data. The extrapolation concept may also be better grasped when it 
is juxtaposed with learning. After students learn from the Court’s opinion 
what measures have been deemed constitutionally successful, they can then 
extrapolate further-reaching measures that the opinion may also be projected 
to validate. Extrapolation represents a significant, though underexplored, 
mechanism by which policies proliferate, particularly in the judicial context. 
 
137 Shipan & Volden, supra note 132, at 842-43. Scott Dodson has helpfully observed that 
“federal law exerts a widespread gravitational pull on state actors.” Scott Dodson, The Gravitational 
Force of Federal Law, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 703, 706 (2016). State legislatures frequently mimic federal 
laws, Dodson notes, and state courts often parrot language from Supreme Court opinions. See id. at 
720-22, 724-27. 
138 Political scientists use different labels to refer to this same phenomenon. See Shipan & 
Volden, supra note 132, at 842 (noting “emulation” is sometimes labeled “imitation”). For a 
sophisticated treatment of this phenomenon in the international law context, see GOODMAN & 
JINKS, supra note 30. For a discussion of the relationship between partisanship and emulation, see 
Daniel M. Butler & Miguel M. Pereira, TRENDS: How Does Partisanship Influence Policy Diffusion?, 
71 POL. RSCH. Q. 801, 809 (2018). 
139 See Shipan & Volden, supra note 132, at 842. 
140 Id. at 842-43. 
141 Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-
Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 293 (1957). 
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Supreme Court opinions that uphold contested measures often serve as a 
focal point for policymakers seeking to extend the validated measure’s 
underlying principles into uncharted terrain. Professor Louis Warsoff 
captured this extrapolation dynamic vividly in the late-1930s when he 
suggested that “a decision upholding a piece of legislation does not merely 
assert the validity of the statute up for consideration, but blazes the path for 
further effort in the same direction.”142 
At the outset, it is important to acknowledge that the lines dividing these 
three mechanisms from one another are often cleaner as a matter of theory 
than in reality.143 Whenever the Supreme Court issues an opinion upholding 
a state or local measure, polities lacking the measure have the opportunity 
simultaneously to: learn what policy has been successful, emulate the policy 
in light of the Court’s imprimatur, and extrapolate from the Court-validated 
policy to take additional steps. At times, determining precisely where, say, 
learning ends and emulation begins can be an extremely difficult task. 
Despite such difficulties, however, distinguishing among these three 
mechanisms through which students respond to the Supreme Court’s teachings 
constitutes a worthwhile endeavor. Identifying three mechanisms, even in 
idealized forms, through which various actors implement the Court’s lessons 
should yield greater linguistic and analytical clarity within constitutional 
discourse. Some of the considerable confusion that currently surrounds the 
Court’s teaching role may stem from the lack of a common vocabulary for 
referring to what are three distinct concepts. Developing a common vocabulary 
could lift this fog of confusion, enabling academic disputes about the educational 
metaphor to identify with increased clarity the grounds of agreement and of 
disagreement. Even if scholars hold competing views regarding whether a 
particular piece of evidence most strongly demonstrates elements of learning, 
emulation, or extrapolation, such disagreement should not present cause for 
great alarm. If anything, such disagreements should be welcomed as signs of 
progress. Those disagreements would indicate that scholars are engaging the 
Court’s educational capacities with a degree of depth and nuance that 
discussions of this topic have seldom contained. 
 
142 Louis A. Warsoff, The Judicial Veto, 27 KY. L.J. 45, 72 (1939); see BICKEL, supra note 4, at 130-31 
(“Declarations of constitutionality—or, if the reader can stand it, of ‘non-unconstitutionality’—have not 
only contemporaneous results, but also portentous aftermaths. . . . Today’s declaration of 
constitutionality will not only tip today’s political balance but may add impetus to the next generations’ 
choice of one policy over another.”). 
143 Cf. Shipan & Volden, supra note 132, at 843-44 (acknowledging difficulties distinguishing 
among learning, competition, and imitation). 
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A. Learning 
This Section explores how various groups learned what policies would 
pass constitutional muster from misguided Supreme Court opinions. 
1. Sterilizations 
The Court’s opinion in Buck v. Bell received widespread media coverage 
when it was issued in 1927, with several prominent newspapers featuring the 
story on their front pages.144 Many of the articles reprinted quotations from 
Justice Holmes’s evocatively written opinion, including his epigram: “Three 
generations of imbeciles are enough.”145 To the extent that journalists offered 
normative views of compulsory sterilization, their reactions were generally 
favorable.146 Buck’s extensive media coverage is significant not only because it 
elevated the sterilization issue’s prominence with the public generally, but 
also because it helped eugenics advocacy groups and state legislators learn the 
statutory requirements that the judiciary would deem constitutionally 
permissible.147 Only one day after Buck, an article in the Los Angeles Times 
gestured toward this point, linking the Court’s opinion with potential 
legislative activity: “The Virginia State law providing for the sterilization of 
mental defectives was upheld today by the United States Supreme Court in 
an opinion deemed of much importance because of the agitation for similar 
legislation in other States.”148 
Harry Laughlin, the sterilization movement’s foremost proponent during 
the 1920s and 1930s, identified one of Buck’s main virtues as providing a central 
statutory text for sterilization reformers. Writing in 1930, Laughlin contended 
that Buck “marked the termination of the basic experimental period in American 
eugenical sterilization laws,” because it provided a clear understanding of the 
requirements courts would uphold in the face of constitutional challenges.149 
Legislators interested in enacting similar statutes, Laughlin explained, “now 
 
144 See, e.g., Sterilization of Defectives Is Held Legal, CHI. DAILY TRIB., May 3, 1927, at 1; Supreme 
Court Upholds Sterilization of Unfit, L.A. TIMES, May 3, 1927, at 1. For additional examples of press 
coverage not featured on the front page, see Upholds Operating on Feeble-Minded, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 
1927, at 19; Associated Press, Virginia Sterilization Law Upheld by Court, WASH. POST, May 3, 1927, at 2. 
145 See, e.g., Sterilization, TIME, May 16, 1927, at 10. 
146 See LOMBARDO, supra note 56, at 174 (“Press reaction was overwhelmingly positive.”); see 
also Editorial, Sterilization, BOS. GLOBE, May 4, 1927, at 20 (commending compulsory sterilization). 
147 See KEVLES, supra note 44, at 111 (“After Buck v. Bell, what was constitutional was clear.”); 
Jacob Broches Aronoff, The Constitutionality of Asexualization Legislation in the United States, 1 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 146, 173 (1927) (“Two decades of experimentation and litigation have made it 
possible to draw fairly definite conclusions of what is required of a law authorizing or making 
mandatory the sterilization of the socially unfit, to keep it within the provisions of the bill of rights 
as included in the Federal and the various state constitutions.”). 
148 Supreme Court Upholds Sterilization of Unfit, supra note 144, at 1. 
149 HARRY H. LAUGHLIN, THE LEGAL STATUS OF EUGENICAL STERILIZATION 53 (1930). 
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know in what due process of law consists when a state undertakes to enforce 
sterilization on selected inmates of certain state institutions.”150 
Evidence suggests that legislatures seeking to enact new compulsory 
sterilization measures knew that the Court had deemed Virginia’s sterilization 
statute constitutional. Individual legislators sometimes invoked Buck in an 
effort to convince their colleagues to adopt sterilization measures.151 
Legislative knowledge of Buck’s outcome is further exemplified by the way in 
which post-Buck statutes closely resembled the Virginia statute. The 
resemblance is so striking that observers have often contended Virginia’s 
measure, validated in Buck, provided a sort of model statute for sterilization 
reform. In 1932, Jacob Landman noted that the Virginia statute “serve[d] as a 
model human sterilization law,”152 and authors have repeatedly invoked that 
same idea ever since.153 If the Virginia measure did act as a model statute, 
moreover, precious few legislatures seemed inclined to deviate much from the 
model when they enacted sterilization measures for their own states.154 
Substantial deviations from Virginia’s statute represented legal uncertainty, 
and that was precisely what Buck had eliminated. 
Some knowledgeable observers of compulsory sterilization statutes have 
suggested that Buck did not merely allow, but affirmatively caused the spread 
of the measures. For instance, Jacob Landman, writing in 1932, commented: 
 
150 Id. at 54-55; see also id. (“We know that in such cases certain definite administrative 
initiative, and procedure to the actual surgical operation, subject to court review (as provided by the 
Virginia statute), constitutes due process of law.”). 
151 See Sterilization Bill Offered at Albany: End of ‘Race Degeneration’ Is Goal—Would Affect Certain 
Types in Institutions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1935, at 8 (noting that a State senator from Binghamton 
commented when introducing a measure: “Our new bill is modeled on the Virginia statute, which 
has been upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States . . . .”). B.O. Whitten, the architect of 
South Carolina’s compulsory sterilization statute, also demonstrated awareness of Buck: “Justice 
Holmes of the United States Supreme Court said; ‘Three generations of imbeciles are enough.’ We 
have on record four generations of imbeciles in South Carolina and three generations of them are 
now at the State [institution].” LARSON, supra note 42, at 125. 
152 J.H. LANDMAN, HUMAN STERILIZATION 84 (1932). 
153 See LARSON, supra note 42, at 28 (calling the Virginia measure a “model eugenic sterilization 
statute”); see also Frances R. Schoenbach, Sterilization Laws—Their Constitutionality—Their Social and 
Scientific Basis, 17 B.U. L. REV. 246, 250 (1937) (“With [Buck], the Virginia Statute became a model 
for the other states, which had only to amend their laws or pass new ones in accordance with the 
pattern of the Virginia law.”). 
154 See, e.g., PHILIP R. REILLY, THE SURGICAL SOLUTION: A HISTORY OF INVOLUNTARY 
STERILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 88 (1991) (“All the laws enacted between 1927 and 1930 
included procedural safeguards comparable to those in the Virginia law that had been upheld by the 
Supreme Court.”); Paul A. Lombardo, Three Generations, No Imbeciles: New Light on Buck v. Bell, 60 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 30, 31 n.5 (1985) (noting that compulsory sterilization statutes passed between 1927 
and 1937 were “closely patterned after the Virginia law”); Richard T. Young, An Evaluation of 
Washington Marriage Laws, 12 WASH. L. REV. & ST. BAR J. 112, 134-35 (1937) (observing that 
recently-enacted sterilization laws were “modeled after the Virginia statute”); West Virginia to Map 
Policy of Sterilization, WASH. POST, June 27, 1934, at 18 (disclosing that West Virginia’s law was 
“almost an exact copy of [the] Virginia law” upheld in Buck). 
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“The declaration of constitutionality of the Virginia law by the Supreme 
Court of the United States in 1927 in the Buck v. Bell case caused a wave of 
human sterilization legislation to spread over the country.”155 Ten years later, 
an article in the Virginia Law Review agreed that Buck “breathed new life into 
the struggle advocating compulsory sterilization of mental defectives.”156 Yet 
even if one believes that such statements are overblown, it seems 
unmistakable that the legislatures learned what sort of measures would work 
from the Supreme Court’s opinion. 
2. Salutes 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Gobitis, validating flag salute 
requirements in public schools, also generated considerable media 
attention.157 Where Buck elicited journalistic celebration, Gobitis instead drew 
journalistic condemnation.158 More than one hundred seventy newspapers 
criticized Gobitis, and only a handful of publications praised the decision.159 
Among the chorus of critics, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch’s editorial offered a 
particularly barbed assessment: “We think this decision of the United States 
Supreme Court is dead wrong. We think its decision is a violation of 
American principle.”160 As disparagingly as Gobitis was received in the nation’s 
newsrooms, however, the opinion received a warm reception in many of the 
nation’s classrooms. Gobitis enabled educators to learn that they could expel 
schoolchildren who refused to salute the American flag without violating the 
Constitution, and it was a lesson that many teachers and principals would 
exhibit mastery of during the next three years. 
It did not take long for school officials around the nation to demonstrate 
awareness of Gobitis. On the day following the Court’s decision, the Boston 
Post ran an article noting: “Informed that the United States Supreme Court, 
by an 8 to 1 decision, had upheld Pennsylvania law requiring public school 
pupils to salute the American flag, school authorities of Boston, Saugus, and 
several other Massachusetts communities reviewed their flag salute cases last 
 
155 LANDMAN, supra note 152, at 89. 
156 Harold Raymond Cotton, The Sterilization Laws and Their Relation to Criminal Law 
Administration, 29 VA. L. REV. 93, 93-94 (1942). 
157 See, e.g., John B. Oakes, Flag Salute Rule in Schools Held Valid by Supreme Court, WASH. POST, 
June 4, 1940, at 1; Flag Salute Order Upheld, L.A. TIMES, June 4, 1940, at 1; Ruling Upholds Right to 
Order Flag Salute, BOS. GLOBE, June 4, 1940, at 7. 
158 For a few criticisms of Gobitis, see Editorial, Problem in Freedom, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1940, 
at 24; Frankfurter v. Stone, NEW REPUBLIC, June 24, 1940, at 843. 
159 See ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 532 (1956). 
160 MASON, supra note 159, at 532 (quoting A Terrible Decision, ST. LOUIS-POST DISPATCH, 
June 4, 1940, at 2C). 
1394 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 169: 1365 
night with a view to taking firmer action.”161 Relatedly, when a principal in 
Cherokee County, Kansas, personally visited a home to warn a Jehovah’s 
Witness mother that her children would be expelled if they refused to salute 
the flag, she showed the mother a letter from the county superintendent that 
invoked Gobitis. “The United States supreme court in an opinion filed on June 
3, 1940, held that it is within the power of a school district board to exact 
participation in the flag salute ceremony as a condition of children’s 
attendance at school,” the letter stated.162 
Evidence that policymakers learned from Gobitis can perhaps most readily 
be detected in the underlying facts of the legal dispute that would ultimately 
become West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, where the Court 
seized the opportunity to disavow its three-year old precedent. On the heels 
of Gobitis, the West Virginia legislature enacted a new provision directing 
schools to “foster[] and perpetuate[] the ideals, principles and spirit of 
Americanism,” and mandating its Board of Education to implement this 
measure.163 In response, the board adopted a statewide resolution requiring 
students to salute the American flag.164 Most tellingly, though, as Barnette 
itself would note, extensive portions of the resolution’s five paragraphs were 
lifted wholesale from Justice Frankfurter’s opinion in Gobitis.165 To take only 
one of many potential examples, the resolution stated: “WHEREAS, The 
West Virginia State Board of Education holds that national unity is the basis 
of national security; that the flag of our Nation is the symbol of our National 
Unity transcending all internal differences, however large within the 
framework of the Constitution . . . .”166 Although the resolution mentions 
neither Gobitis nor the Supreme Court, the origins of this particular legal 
learning are unmistakable.167 A similar, if more muted, dynamic can be 
discerned in the text of a resolution that Raymond, New Hampshire, enacted 
on June 10, 1940, exactly one week after the Court issued Gobitis, that required 
“every pupil, regardless of religious persuasion, . . . shall salute the . . . Flag 
whenever the salute is called for.”168 Had the resolution’s drafters been 
unaware that Gobitis recently validated such requirements in the face of 
 
161 Ask Advice in State’s Flag Cases: Boston, Saugus, Other School Boards May Take Firmer Step, 
BOS. POST, June 4, 1940, at 1. 
162 State v. Smith, 127 P.2d 518, 520 (Kan. 1942). 
163 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 626 n.1 (1943) (quoting W. VA. CODE 
§ 1734 (1941 Supp.)). 
164 See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 626-27. 
165 See id. at 626 (noting the resolution “contain[ed] recitals taken largely from the Court’s 
Gobitis opinion”). 
166 Id. at 626 n.2. For the resolution’s full text, see id. 
167 See supra text accompanying note 89 (quoting Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 
586, 596 (1940)). 
168 MANWARING, supra note 73, at 187 (emphasis added). 
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religious objection, it seems improbable that the resolution would have 
explicitly addressed religion. 
Some contemporaneous observers connected the sharp increase in salute-
related expulsions between 1940 and 1943 to the Court’s opinion sanctioning 
the practice. The surge in expulsions, one author stated, “must be attributed 
directly to the results of the Gobitis decision.”169 While somewhat more 
equivocal, the Kansas Supreme Court in 1942 intimated that the Court’s 
opinion provoked school administrators in Cherokee County, Kansas, to 
contemplate expelling students for refusing to salute the flag: “It was not until 
after the decision of the Gobitis case . . . that the school boards of the districts 
where the appellants’ children attended school . . . conceived the notion that 
the failure of such a child to salute the flag justified expelling the child from 
school.”170 It is possible, of course, that even if the Court had never validated 
flag-salute mandates, expulsions of Jehovah’s Witnesses would have still 
increased between 1940 and 1943. School districts in several states had already 
installed salute requirements before the Court issued Gobitis, and others may 
have joined them anyway after the bombing of Pearl Harbor in December 
1941 increased patriotic sentiment. Nevertheless, David Manwaring—who 
resists feeble causal attributions to Gobitis in other contexts—has flatly 
concluded: “Many communities passed new salute regulations in direct 
response to the Gobitis ruling.”171 It seems beyond doubt that school 
administrators learned from Gobitis that they need not worry about the 
constitutionality of expelling students for refusing to salute the flag. 
3. Searches 
In no doctrinal arena is this learning dynamic more apparent than in the 
context of the Supreme Court’s opinions involving automotive searches. The 
Court’s opinion in New York v. Belton received coverage from a few high-
profile news outlets, but it came nowhere close to making the big media 
splashes that Buck and Gobitis had previously made.172 Although law 
professors frequently criticize the press coverage of the Court for providing 
what they regard as distorted and misleading accounts, at least one of the 
journalists summarizing Belton did an admirable job of distilling the opinion’s 
holding in this intricate Fourth Amendment context. Laura Kiernan, writing 
in the Washington Post, observed that Belton “ruled that a police officer who 
has stopped a car and made a lawful arrest may, without a warrant, search 
 
169 Heller, supra note 90, at 449. 
170 State v. Smith, 127 P.2d 518, 523 (Kan. 1942). 
171 MANWARING, supra note 73, at 187. 
172 Jim Mann, Stewart Offers Confusing Final Opinions on Police Searches, L.A. TIMES, July 2, 
1981, at A18; High Court Upsets 2 Rulings on Police Search of Autos, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1981, at A16. 
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virtually anything in the passenger compartment.”173 Of course, even had 
Kiernan—and all other newspaper reporters, for that matter—articulated 
Belton’s rule in a highly specious manner, police officers would not have 
carried out their responsibilities to comport with such mistranslations. 
When it comes to constitutional criminal procedure opinions, police 
officers have plenty of incentives to learn the Supreme Court’s views. Indeed, 
it risks only modest exaggeration to contend that the Court’s interpretations 
of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments guide the bulk of an investigating police 
officer’s legal responsibilities.174 The point here is not to suggest that 
patrolling officers, after a long day of walking their respective beats, 
decompress by curling up in the evening with the Court’s latest slip opinions. 
They overwhelmingly do not.175 Instead, police officers responsible for 
implementing the Court’s directives typically rely upon intermediaries who 
distill relevant judicial opinions into a manageable set of guidelines. As Belton 
demonstrates, simply because officers do not generally read Supreme Court 
opinions in their entirety does not mean that they do not learn their holdings. 
The notion that police officers learn what is constitutionally permitted 
from the Supreme Court arose throughout Gant’s proceedings, and even 
appeared in the majority and dissenting opinions themselves. During oral 
argument, Justice Stephen Breyer, who would go on to dissent in Gant, made 
the following statement in an apparent effort to highlight the costs of 
abandoning Belton’s bright-line rule: “[W]e tell our police a simple thing. We 
tell them when you arrest somebody who is in a car you can search the 
passenger compartment of the car okay. Simple. And we’ve trained a hundred 
thousand police officers to do that and they do it.”176 In his opinion for the 
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Court in Gant, moreover, Justice Stevens confronted the fact that “Belton has 
been widely taught in police academies and that law enforcement officers have 
relied on the rule in conducting vehicle searches during the past 28 years.”177 
Despite this long history of reliance, Justice Stevens suggested that the costs 
of requiring officers to learn a new approach were not prohibitive considering 
the serious incursions on motorists’ security and privacy that flowed from 
Belton.178 In dissent, Justice Samuel Alito similarly stressed that the Court in 
Gant required officers to learn a new method of searching, and brought the 
tangible consequences of that re-education into sharp relief: “The Belton rule 
has been taught to police officers for more than a quarter century . . . . It is 
likely that, on the very day when this opinion is announced, numerous vehicle 
searches will be conducted in good faith by police officers who were taught 
the Belton rule.”179 
Reactions to Gant within the corridors of both law schools and police 
departments verify that the Supreme Court’s criminal procedure opinions can 
require police officers to relearn how to execute their duties. In assessing 
Gant’s significance, Professor Barbara Armacost expressly invoked the 
language of learning to describe this phenomenon: “[O]fficers will have to 
learn new, more nuanced rules for conducting traffic stop searches . . . .”180 In 
this same vein, several law enforcement officials independently observed that 
Gant’s holding meant police officers would need to be re-educated to comply 
with the Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. The Chief of 
Police in Fort Wayne, Indiana, noted: “I think it’s going to be an educational 
issue where we’re going to have to disseminate [Gant’s holding] to officers 
and let them know what this change is and what the limitations are.”181 A 
police chief in Arizona agreed that “the officer on the street needs to be 
 
have been trained that this is the correct way to balance the need for effective law enforcement and 
officer safety.”). 
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educated,” and that complying with Gant would “boil down to training.”182 In 
reaction to Gant, some police officers suggested that Belton itself had inspired 
an earlier round of officer re-education in their jurisdictions. “It’s nothing 
new, because back in the early 1970s, you were under the same restrictions 
and then it got more lenient, but now it’s going back the other way,” one police 
officer in Virginia said.183 Ken Wallentine, a law enforcement official in Utah, 
shared this general recollection: “I remember being a young cop and being 
pleasantly surprised by the Belton decision . . . .”184 Wallentine also expressed 
surprise with Gant, but he had no doubt that officers would learn to comply 
with the new decision.185 
B. Emulating 
This Section explores how various groups have emulated the Supreme 
Court’s legitimation of bad policies because those policies have received the 
Court’s constitutional blessing. 
1. Sterilizations 
The Supreme Court’s ability to legitimate state policies in the American 
constitutional order, and thereby to inspire emulation on the part of some 
states that lacked the disputed policy can be seen clearly in the context of 
Buck v. Bell. In Buck’s aftermath, for example, one Alabama newspaper 
commended the decision as presenting a golden opportunity “to convince 
open-minded folk that such legislation is wise.”186 Harry Laughlin, the 
nation’s preeminent champion of sterilization, demonstrated keen awareness 
of the Court’s emulative effect in 1930 when he explained: “This decision 
means also that in the future eugenical sterilization will be looked upon by 
the American people as a reasonable and conservative matter; it is no longer 
a wild or radical proposition.”187 Six years later, a columnist for the Los Angeles 
Times similarly attempted to transform general reverence for the Court into 
support for compulsory sterilization as a mainstream phenomenon: “‘Three 
generations of imbeciles are enough.’ These are not the words of a 
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propagandist or of a social fanatic, but of a Chief [sic] Justice of the United 
States Supreme Court in deciding a case that has become a precedent for the 
decision of the lesser courts of the sovereign states.”188 If the vaunted 
Supreme Court declares that a contested practice does not violate the 
Constitution, the thinking here seems to run, other states should at least 
contemplate implementing what cannot be a fringe practice. 
The language of legitimation that sterilization scholars use to describe 
Buck’s effect provides testament to the outsized role the Supreme Court plays 
in shaping the American constitutional order. In 1929, Jacob Landman 
predicted the Court’s “official sanction” of sterilization would prompt “many 
states [to] enact similar legislation.”189 Landman himself observed that this 
prediction was borne out in just a few years, as he noted in 1932 that 
sterilization’s validation from “the highest court of the land” played a 
motivational role in states adopting sterilization measures.190 The passage of 
decades has only reinforced this reading of Buck. Mary Dudziak contended 
that Justice Holmes’s “uncritical embrace of eugenic policy . . . gave a shaky 
eugenics movement a strong stamp of legitimacy.”191 Mark Haller similarly 
noted that, in Buck, “the Supreme Court put its seal of approval upon the 
Virginia sterilization law, and brought renewed vigor to the sterilization 
campaign.”192 William Leuchtenberg agreed that Buck “gave the imprimatur 
of the United States Supreme Court to the eugenics movement,” and thus 
heralded a new, albeit unwelcome, day.193 
That Buck emerged not just from the Supreme Court, but from the 
particularly revered mind of Justice Holmes appeared to have enhanced the 
opinion’s capacity for inspiring emulation. Writing in the St. John’s Law 
 
188 Fred Hogue, Social Eugenics, L.A. TIMES, June 21, 1936, at 30; see also Fred Hogue, Social 
Eugenics, L.A. TIMES, July 24, 1938, at H23 (“Probably the strongest argument for the eugenic 
sterilization of the feeble-minded is contained in an opinion handed down by the Federal Supreme 
Court in . . . the celebrated case of Buck v. Bell.”). Although the comment did not appear in 
relationship to Buck, Mark Tushnet has perceptively noted that “memorable phrases” can play an 
important role in fulfilling the Court’s educational function. See Tushnet, supra note 4, at 222. 
189 LANDMAN, supra note 152, at 464. 
190 Id. at 84. Harry Laughlin advanced this same idea in 1930: “The Virginia statute, enacted 
in 1924, is especially important because it is the first sterilization statute to be carried to the Supreme 
Court of the United States and to receive a decision of the highest court of the land that the 
particular statute is constitutional.” LAUGHLIN, supra note 149, at 7. 
191 Mary L. Dudziak, Oliver Wendell Holmes as Eugenic Reformer: Rhetoric in the Writing of 
Constitutional Law, 71 IOWA L. REV. 833, 836 (1986); see also A Survey of Statutory Changes in North 
Carolina in 1929, 7 N.C. L. REV. 363, 395 (1929) (discussing the Court’s “stamp of approval 
upon . . . sterilization . . . as a social policy”). 
192 MARK H. HALLER, EUGENICS: HEREDITARIAN ATTITUDES IN AMERICAN 
THOUGHT 139 (1963). 
193 LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 40, at 15. 
1400 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 169: 1365 
Review only months after the Court issued Buck, Jacob Aronoff pursued this 
angle with particular relish. Buck, Aronoff contended, 
is bound . . . to effect a change in the judicial as well as the popular attitude 
to this type of legislation. This is due largely to the fact that the opinion was 
written by Mr. Justice Holmes. Judge Holmes is recognized as a jurist whose 
social and political philosophy is essentially humane and who recognizes the 
fact that in constitutional questions the decision of a court is influenced 
largely by the court’s social and political philosophy. An opinion by him 
finding an asexualization law constitutional will inevitably cause a re-
examination of the subject not only from the point of view of the legal 
questions involved but also with a view of re-evaluating the basis of the non-
legal objections directed to all such legislation.194 
It may seem as though Aronoff ’s remark merely betrays the Court-centric 
view of the world to which law professors seem particularly prone.195 And that 
dynamic may well partially be at work here. But, in Aronoff ’s defense, reverence 
for Holmes occupied an important place among educated Americans that seems 
likely to have imbued Buck with even greater significance. 
Harry Laughlin, for his part, seldom seemed to miss an opportunity to 
lend Buck some additional luster by mentioning that Justice Holmes authored 
the opinion.196 And for good reason, too. By the time that Holmes wrote Buck 
in 1927, he had already become a nationally revered figure whose celebrity 
status extended beyond the narrow confines of law—a rare feat, indeed, even 
for a Supreme Court Justice. In March 1926, in honor of his eighty-fifth 
birthday, Holmes’s visage graced the cover of Time magazine, which remarked 
upon the jurist’s “venerability,” “poetic expression,” and “liberal cast of 
thought.”197 Time’s praise, enthusiastic though it was, seemed if anything 
downright restrained in comparison to the jubilation that Holmes’s birthday 
occasioned at the New Republic during that same year. “The fruit of his 
wisdom has become part of the common stock of civilization,” the magazine’s 
editorial solemnly intoned. “Wherever law is known, he is known.”198 It 
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continued: “Steeped in legal history, he above all others has shaped the 
methods and ideas of modern jurisprudence . . . . The tender, wise, beautiful 
being who is Mr. Justice Holmes in himself redeems the whole legal 
profession.”199 The praise for Holmes during this era was not limited to 
political publications. Even the American Journal of Public Health, in 
recounting Buck’s implications for a medical audience, celebrated Holmes as 
“that great jurist.”200 
The power of Supreme Court opinions to elicit emulation should not be 
viewed as some sort of all-powerful force that mere mortals cannot resist. Jacob 
Landman appeared to commit this analytical error, overstating Buck’s emulative 
effect on other states in 1929. “Little does it matter what the legislative and 
judicial history of the sterilization laws in this country has been,” Landman 
wrote. “Buck v. Bell has now definitely committed the United States to a policy 
of human sterilization for good or for bad as a means of coping with the socially 
undesirable in our midst.”201 But this statement goes too far.202 In the context of 
Buck, for example, some state legislatures contemplated and then ultimately 
declined to enact compulsory sterilization statutes.203 Nevertheless, even if Buck 
did not compel all forty-eight states to adopt compulsory sterilization measures, 
its emulative effect on many states seems undeniable. 
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2. Salutes 
The Gobitis opinion also vividly illuminates the Supreme Court’s 
capacity to lend legitimacy to contested measures, and in turn to motivate 
policymakers nationwide to adopt matching measures. Gobitis, moreover, 
displays this emulative effect within a fascinating context: where the Court 
inspires policy actions even though it may not have intended those 
inspirational effects. On this view, Justice Frankfurter’s opinion in Gobitis 
approximates the inversion of Justice Holmes’s opinion in Buck. Holmes, the 
ardent eugenicist, would have presumably been delighted that Buck sparked 
the compulsory sterilization movement; conversely, Frankfurter would have 
regarded the spark Gobitis provided to compulsory flag salute requirements 
as inadvertent, and perhaps even unwelcome. In one of the aforementioned 
passages where Gobitis can be viewed as obliquely casting doubt on the 
wisdom of flag salute requirements, Frankfurter’s opinion may be read as 
gently encouraging state legislators to prohibit such requirements. 
Frankfurter, toward the very end of Gobitis, offered an abstract paean to the 
virtue of judicial restraint in democratic societies. “Where all the effective 
means of inducing political changes are left free from interference,” 
Frankfurter wrote, “education in the abandonment of foolish legislation is 
itself a training in liberty.”204 If Frankfurter actually hoped that policymakers 
would ban flag salute requirements, subsequent events would make that hope 
look foolish. Evidently, not a single entity that mandated the flag salute in 
1940 jettisoned those measures between the Court’s opinions in Gobitis and 
three years later in Barnette.205 The American Civil Liberties Union’s brief in 
Barnette seized upon this evidence and used it to tweak Frankfurter by noting 
it did “not commend the doctrine that somehow legislative authorities will 
themselves abandon ‘foolish legislation’ if ‘the effective means of inducing 
political changes are left free.’”206 
The critical point when considering Gobitis’s emulative effect is not so 
much that the opinion failed to prompt the retraction of extant flag-salute 
measures, but instead that Gobitis appears to have played a role in the 
expansion of such measures. When the Supreme Court validated the 
constitutionality of flag salute requirements, the Court’s validation itself 
shaped how those measures were perceived and exerted influence in some 
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communities. Alpheus Thomas Mason has captured this idea in observing 
that Frankfurter’s aside about “foolish legislation” was undercut considerably 
by the fact that it appeared in the course of an opinion placing the Supreme 
Court’s “stamp of approval” on that legislation.207 “The Court itself thus 
became a weapon in the struggle for men’s minds,” Mason explained. “By its 
approbation, ‘foolish’ laws become somewhat less so; novel restraint, lodged 
in the structure of government, had become ‘constitutional.’ With the blessing 
of an authoritative Supreme Court judgment, the country’s local school 
officials tightened up on the flag salute requirement.”208 
The notion that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Gobitis elicited a measure 
of emulation from other jurisdictions is bolstered by the dynamics 
surrounding West Virginia’s adoption of its statewide flag-salute mandate. 
According to Manwaring’s leading account of the flag salute opinions, “West 
Virginia authorities reached out rather mechanically to take the new 
opportunities Gobitis seemed to offer.”209 Manwaring contends that West 
Virginia enacted its measure not because of some deep, abiding conviction 
regarding the transcendent importance of flag salutes, but instead because an 
opinion from the Supreme Court authorized the regulations. “When 
challenged in court, [West Virginians] were willing to play the game out to 
the end, but with no deep personal involvement in the outcome,” Manwaring 
writes. “Nobody really cared.”210 On this view, West Virginia’s impetus for 
adopting the measure seems to have been attributable less to the policy’s 
intrinsic appeal, and more to the prestigious actor in the constitutional order 
that blessed the practice. 
Here, too, the ability of judicial opinions to inspire emulation ought not 
be overstated—yes, even when they are handed down from the highest court 
in the land. Although Gobitis validated flag salute requirements, the Court’s 
imprimatur appearing on such measures did not inoculate the Court—and 
the practices—from receiving vehement criticism in newspapers and 
magazines.211 Gobitis thus reveals that some citizens, in at least some enclaves, 
at least occasionally, treat the Court’s opinion as just that: an opinion on 
constitutional meaning, rather than the opinion on constitutional meaning 
that articulates an eternal truth. Still, that Gobitis received opprobrium in 
relatively elite circles should not overshadow that the opinion also encouraged 
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some emulators along the way. Given that flag salute requirements often 
stemmed from school administrators making new enforcement 
determinations about preexisting measures, Gobitis would not have needed to 
elicit emulation from many actors in order to make a big difference in the 
lives of Jehovah’s Witnesses. 
3. Searches 
The capacity of Supreme Court opinions to elicit emulation seems least 
pronounced in the context of New York v. Belton’s authorization of warrantless 
automobile searches. The conduct of arresting police officers, after all, seems 
far less likely to stem from any positive associations they have toward the 
Supreme Court, and more likely to stem instead from a desire to avoid having 
their work undone, either internally by the police department or externally 
by a reviewing court. Moreover, because Belton endorsed close to the largest 
conceivable latitude for law enforcement officials conducting warrantless 
vehicle searches, police officers may have happily complied with the decision 
had it issued from even the lowliest court in all the land. 
Nevertheless, in the context of warrantless vehicle searches, the emulative 
effects of Supreme Court opinions might be better construed as diminished 
rather than nonexistent. For instance, when the arresting officer in Gant was 
asked at a suppression hearing why he searched the automobile after he had 
already handcuffed the defendant and placed him in a patrol car, the officer 
replied simply: “Because the law says we can do it.”212 The arresting officer 
could have, of course, intended to convey many different sentiments with that 
opaque statement. But one way of restating this statement more formally 
would be: “Because the Fourth Amendment, as interpreted by the Supreme 
Court’s opinion in New York v. Belton, deems such searches ‘reasonable.’” It is 
almost comically difficult to imagine a police officer uttering that hyper-
formal statement. But this difficulty is precisely the point. That police officers 
typically understand the category of “the law” to be more or less coterminous 
with “Supreme Court interpretations of the Constitution” bespeaks a respect 
for Supreme Court authority that bears a strong family resemblance to 
emulation. In response to the Court’s opinion in Gant, moreover, Ken 
Wallentine, a law enforcement official in Utah, provided a full-throated 
articulation of the emulative effect that the Supreme Court’s criminal 
procedure opinions can exert on police officers. “The Belton decision may 
have made an officer’s job a little easier,” Wallentine commented, “and the 
Gant decision may well make the job harder, but at the end of the day, cops 
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will continue to uphold, defend and honor the Constitution as interpreted by 
the United States Supreme Court.”213 
C. Extrapolating 
This Section explores how various groups take actions and form policies 
by extrapolating from misguided Supreme Court opinions. 
1. Sterilizations 
With Buck established as precedent, legislatures in some states sought to 
extrapolate from the opinion by expanding the potential classes of candidates 
for compulsory sterilization beyond those citizens displaying low mental 
aptitude. The American Journal of Public Health telegraphed such legislative 
expansions by noting Buck “opens future possibilities of vast importance in 
the field of eugenics and public health.”214 In Virginia, for instance, the 
legislature passed a bill that would have widened sterilization’s scope to 
include inmates in state-administered institutions suffering from congenital 
blindness and other specified maladies.215 Virginia’s Governor, however, 
vetoed the measure, contending that the proposal would have required the 
Supreme Court of the United States to validate the new practice, a move that 
could jeopardize the existing program.216 In Oklahoma, of course, the state 
legislature aimed to extend Buck’s structure by enacting a sterilization statute 
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See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Toole, 448 N.E.2d 1264, 1266 (Mass. 1983); State v. Hernandez, 410 So. 2d 
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Supreme Court decisions than are other actors within our constitutional universe. 
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AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 773, 774 (1927), cited in LOMBARDO, supra note 56, at 175. 
215 Virginius Dabney, Virginia Executive Sets Veto Record, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1930, at 7. 
216 See id. 
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that targeted “habitual criminal” offenders.217 It was Oklahoma’s effort at 
extrapolation into the criminal realm that the Court rejected in Skinner.218 
The eugenics movement greeted these attempted expansions of Buck with 
open arms, as its most devout proponents harbored grand ambitions for 
expanding the reach of sterilization. Harry Laughlin noted five years after 
Buck, now that compulsory sterilization was “soundly established in long 
practice,” it should be evident that “the subject for sterilization does not 
necessarily have to be an inmate of an institution, but may be selected with 
equal legality from the population at large.”219 Laughlin also expressed the 
hope that compulsory sterilization could even someday be extended to 
include “apparently normal individuals who have come from exceedingly 
inferior stocks, judged by the constitutional qualities of their close kin.”220 
For eugenicists, who viewed Buck as bedrock and projected outward from that 
point, prospects in the quest for improving the human race through 
sterilization appeared virtually limitless. 
2. Salutes 
Legal authorities also took Gobitis and ran with it, as they utilized the 
opinion validating flag salute requirements to extrapolate numerous 
concomitant methods of harassing Jehovah’s Witnesses. After school districts 
expelled Jehovah’s Witness students for refusing to salute, for instance, 
several jurisdictions subsequently charged the children with violating truancy 
and delinquency laws.221 The Court’s opinion formed the basis for these 
charges, one commentator noted, because authorities, “construing (perhaps 
too literally) the broad grants of power implied by the Gobitis decision, . . . 
have later prosecuted [expelled students] as delinquents.”222 Relatedly, 
jurisdictions also extended Gobitis to charge Jehovah’s Witness parents for 
contributing to the delinquency of their children by instructing them not to 
salute the flag.223 Finally, judges extended Gobitis further still, and 
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following expulsions). One superior court in Michigan City, Indiana, for example, convicted a 
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transformed the newly designated delinquents into wards of the state by 
ordering the Jehovah’s Witness children removed from their homes and sent 
to reformatories.224 Again, here, the sole justification for such orders was that 
the children did not attend school following their expulsions for refusing to 
salute the flag.225 
After the Court issued Gobitis in June 1940, moreover, various mobs 
subjected Jehovah’s Witnesses to hundreds of violent attacks.226 The most 
serious of these attacks transpired in locations dotted throughout the 
nation—from Kennebunk, Maine, to Jackson, Mississippi, from Litchfield, 
Illinois, to Rockville, Maryland.227 The question becomes: Can those attacks 
accurately be understood as being directly extrapolated from Gobitis? Some 
scholars have seemed to answer that question affirmatively, appearing to 
assert that Gobitis single-handedly provoked the violence.228 But the answer 
to that question seems more nebulous than these scholars allow because mobs, 
being mobs, tend not to memorialize their animating commitments in written 
form. A few of the attacks against Jehovah’s Witnesses, moreover, actually 
antedated the Court’s opinion in Gobitis.229 Accordingly, unless those pre-
Gobitis attacks can be construed as occurring in anticipation of the Court’s 
opinion, the but-for argument seems difficult to sustain. The pre-Gobitis 
attacks seem more likely attributable to a reservoir of anti-Jehovah’s 
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Witnesses sentiment stemming in part from the nation’s well-documented 
history of hostilities toward religious minorities.230 
Still, even if some assessments have been too categorical, it seems safe to 
conclude that Gobitis played a role in leading some vigilantes to conclude that 
Jehovah’s Witnesses should be punished for disloyalty. This more tentative 
formulation of Gobitis’s effect is how the most discerning newspaper and 
magazine journalists characterized the situation at that time. “We have the 
‘liberal’ members of the Supreme Court to thank—at least in part—for the 
religious riots which have been breaking out in Maine,” the New York Herald 
Tribune commented. “This conservative old New England state has seen little 
lynching or other lawlessness; but the Supreme Court’s recent decision that 
Jehovah’s Witnesses must salute the flag seems to have convinced several 
hundred Maine rustics that it is their personal responsibility to see this decree 
carried out.”231 The St. Louis Post Dispatch generalized this account: 
It would be a mistake . . . to attribute these outbreaks of violence against 
religious minorities solely to the United States Supreme Court’s opinion 
upholding the compulsory flag salute in public schools . . . . Yet there can be 
little doubt that most unfortunate decision will be an encouragement for self-
appointed guardians of patriotism and the national moralists to take the law 
into their own hands.232 
The Nation echoed this understanding, as it noted that Gobitis made a 
previously “tense situation . . . worse,” by making Jehovah’s Witnesses into 
“obvious targets for persecution.”233 Manwaring’s historical assessment, 
written with the benefit of nearly two decades’ hindsight, echoed these 
qualified contemporaneous evaluations: “All that can be said with any degree 
of assurance is that Gobitis almost certainly helped to touch off what was 
already an explosive situation.”234 
At least one piece of evidence, however, makes unmistakably clear that 
some observers extrapolated a broad principle from Gobitis indicating that 
Jehovah’s Witnesses were disloyal to the nation. One month after the Court 
issued Gobitis, journalist Beulah Amidon observed a group of vigilantes in a 
small, unnamed southern town violently force its population of Jehovah’s 
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Witnesses to vacate the area. As the mob carried out this banishment, they 
periodically hurled insults along with debris toward the Jehovah’s Witnesses. 
“We got no room for dirty traitors here,” Amidon overheard one crowd 
member yell.235 The local sheriff surveying the procession appeared 
sympathetic to this assessment, as he made no move to control the crowd. 
When Amidon approached the sheriff to inquire what had provoked the 
scene, he responded: “Jehovah’s Witnesses . . . . They’re running ‘em out of 
here. They’re traitors—the Supreme Court says so. Ain’t you heard?”236 Even 
if that message was decidedly not the one Gobitis sent, it was nevertheless the 
one that some audience members received. 
3. Searches 
The Court’s criminal procedure jurisprudence, as exemplified by Belton 
and Gant, involves a context where a considerable amount of extrapolation 
seems guaranteed. Some sophisticated academic commentators have 
suggested that police officers will, almost by their very nature, consciously 
probe the Fourth Amendment’s constitutional boundaries. Wayne LaFave, 
for example, has contended that while police officers will not generally 
transgress clear borders that courts have established regarding searches, they 
will march right up to the line of what courts have deemed permissible.237 
According to LaFave, lower courts encountered so much trouble applying 
Chimel’s “immediate control” test to vehicles before Belton, largely because 
law enforcement officials sought to test, and even to expand, existing 
constitutional limits. “[T]he ‘difficulty’ and ‘disarray’ [in lower courts] the 
Belton majority alluded to has been more a product of the police seeing how 
much they could get away with . . . than of their being confronted with 
inherently ambiguous situations,” LaFave wrote.238 With this view in mind, 
Belton provided police officers with strong incentives to maximize their 
interactions with any motorists they deemed suspicious in the hopes that an 
ensuing search would uncover incriminating evidence. 
Legal scholarship can be understood as suggesting that police officers 
built upon Belton to extrapolate a broad principle that eventually enabled 
them to conduct exploratory searches of almost any moving vehicle.239 At two 
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key steps along the way, the Supreme Court aided law enforcement’s 
successful effort to win virtually unfettered discretion in such automotive 
searches. First, in Whren v. United States, the Supreme Court authorized 
police officers to pull over motorists for committing trivial traffic infractions, 
even if the stop was plainly pretextual.240 Second, in Atwater v. City of Lago 
Vista, the Supreme Court authorized police officers to arrest motorists for 
committing even the smallest of misdemeanor traffic offenses.241 With Belton 
as a background force, these two cases combined to mean that an officer who 
wanted to search a car, but had no genuine basis for doing so, could acquire 
justification by trailing the car for the short distance required to witness the 
driver commit a traffic infraction.242 As one writer distilled the trilogy’s 
implications: “The officer could then pull the vehicle over (Whren), arrest the 
driver for the traffic infraction (Atwater), and get a ‘free’ search of the vehicle 
incident to the driver’s arrest (Belton).”243 That the burden of these 
exploratory searches would fall disproportionately on racial minorities was 
perfectly predictable.244 Indeed, given today’s racial realities, some police 
officers extrapolating lessons from the Belton-Whren-Atwater line of cases 
might even conclude that the Court had given them licenses to conduct 
racially-motivated exploratory searches. 
Until this point, I have explored the notion that the Supreme Court can 
act as a bad teacher. Examining the Court-as-educator analogy from this 
unconventional vantage point leaves us better positioned to appreciate what 
it would mean for the Supreme Court to teach in the more conventional 
sense. In other words, understanding how the Court has taught badly 
enhances our ability to understand how the Court has taught well. It is to this 
task—illustrating the Supreme Court as good teacher—that I now turn. 
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III. GOOD TEACHING REVISITED 
The Supreme Court can be understood to teach well in at least two 
distinct senses. First, the Court can validate a constitutionally desirable 
policy and thus assist it in becoming more widespread by enabling other 
jurisdictions to learn, emulate, and extrapolate from the validated measure. 
Second, the Court can suppress a constitutionally undesirable policy by 
issuing an opinion that invalidates the measure and thus remove it from the 
menu of available policies. 
A. Good Policy Diffusion 
The first three background phases that potentially invite concluding that 
the Supreme Court has acted as a good teacher are identical to those explored 
above for reading the Supreme Court as a bad teacher. First, a period of legal 
uncertainty is; second, eliminated by a Supreme Court opinion validating a 
particular policy, which; third, becomes substantially more widespread 
throughout the nation following the opinion. Only with the fourth phrase do 
the good teacher and bad teacher models diverge: Where in the bad teacher 
model examined above the Supreme Court reversed course (by either 
overturning its prior decision outright or dramatically retreating from its 
initial opinion), in the good teacher model the Supreme Court instead stays 
the course (standing by the core holding and reasoning of its initial opinion). 
With this fourth condition, in other words, the Supreme Court teaches badly 
when it imparts an incorrect substantive lesson, and the Supreme Court 
teaches well when it imparts a correct substantive lesson. 
The Court’s opinion in Ginsberg v. New York—which upheld a state law 
that prohibited selling pornographic materials to minors, but not to adults—
provides an excellent encapsulation of the Court’s ability to serve as a good 
teacher.245 Prior to Ginsberg, considerable legal uncertainty engulfed the 
question of whether states could ban sexually graphic materials in an effort to 
avoid harmful influences on youth without violating the First Amendment. 
States clearly could not realize their desire to shield youth from sexual 
content by simply banning the sale of lewd material to anyone in the entire 
state, regardless of age.246 Many states, of course, maintained a desire to 
prevent children from accessing sexual materials, but the question was how 
they could do so in a manner consistent with the Constitution. As one of the 
amicus briefs filed in Ginsberg supporting New York’s statute described the 
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existing legal landscape: “To say that the law is currently up in the air is an 
understatement of the true state of affairs.”247 
It was against this nebulous legal backdrop that the New York legislature 
in 1965 offered what was then a relatively unusual approach for addressing 
the problem.248 The New York legislature addressed the issue of youth and 
sexually explicit materials by enacting a “variable obscenity” law.249 This 
measure prohibited selling sexually explicit materials to minors on the theory 
that these materials were obscene for children and adolescents, even though 
the identical materials would not be obscene for adults.250 The New York 
legislature crafted the statute in extraordinarily detailed language in order to 
minimize encroachments on the freedom of expression.251 In Ginsberg v. New 
York, the Supreme Court in 1968 eliminated this period of legal uncertainty 
by validating New York’s narrowly drawn statute.252 Justice William Brennan’s 
opinion for the Court in Ginsberg reasoned that the state possesses greater 
authority to control the conduct of children than adults, and that the state 
also had a legitimate interest in promoting the health and well-being of its 
youth.253 Accordingly, Brennan concluded it was not irrational for New York 
legislators to determine that viewing the sex material statutorily defined as 
obscene would be harmful to minors.254 
After the Court issued Ginsberg, legislators around the nation quickly 
leaped to enact variable obscenity statutes modeled on the New York measure. 
In a book published in 1970, only two years after the Court issued Ginsberg, 
Stephen Wasby commented upon the outpouring of legislative activity. “At 
least twenty city councils across the country were found to have passed 
statutes like that validated in Ginsberg in less than a year from the time of the 
decision,” Wasby wrote. “Additional impact of Ginsberg is shown by the 
numerous state statutes passed in 1969 legislative sessions, with language 
closely tracking that of the New York statute, and in the language of proposed 
federal legislation dealing with the mailing of obscene material or advertising 
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to minors.”255 This initial legislative frenzy did not soon subside. By 1976, 
Frederick Schauer could note that Ginsberg had sparked reform in nearly all 
fifty state legislatures: “[V]irtually every state has a statute dealing in 
particular with the sale, distribution or exhibition of obscene materials to 
minors. The origin of all these statutes is the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Ginsberg v. New York . . . .”256 
Since the Court decided Ginsberg, it has in no way retreated from its core 
determination that states may prohibit minors from purchasing sexually 
explicit materials that they cannot prohibit adults from purchasing.257 In 
order to appreciate Ginsberg’s continued vitality, consider that the dispute was 
triggered when a storeowner sold “‘girlie’ magazines” to a minor.258 Such 
prohibitions remain very much alive today, even if the Internet has succeeded 
in rendering them virtually irrelevant.259 
The same three mechanisms through which subsets of the public respond 
to the Court’s bad teaching also pertain to the Court’s good teaching. With 
respect to Ginsberg, evidence suggests that legislators learned what policy 
would pass constitutional muster, emulated that policy in light of the Supreme 
Court’s clout, and extrapolated additional policies that might be seen as 
extensions of the validated policy. I will now briefly explain how each of these 
three mechanisms applies to Ginsberg. 
Evidence suggests that legislators learned from Ginsberg because in the 
opinion’s aftermath states enacted variable obscenity statutes that were 
essentially facsimiles of New York’s statute. Several writers predicted early on 
that the New York measure would serve as a sort of model statute for other 
jurisdictions.260 That prediction, of course, bore fruit almost immediately. In 
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November 1968, only seven months after Ginsberg, one newspaper article 
commented the decision “touched off a hopeful scramble among states which 
do not yet have” variable obscenity statutes.261 In 1970, Stanley Laughlin 
commented that “[i]n response to Justice Brennan’s opinion, legislative 
draftsmen, following a time-honored practice, have slavishly copied” New 
York’s statute.262 The influence of New York’s variable obscenity statute, as 
noted above, has proved extremely durable. 
That the Supreme Court placed its imprimatur on a variable obscenity 
statute appears to have prompted emulation on the part of legislators mindful 
of the Court’s prestige in matters of constitutional interpretation. One 
commentator noted that Brennan’s opinion in Ginsberg seemed to go out of 
its way to “give[] license to the states to experiment” with shaping 
particularities of their variable obscenity statutes.263 But the states 
overwhelmingly rejected that invitation. It hardly seems extravagant to 
maintain that so many jurisdictions enacted variable obscenity statutes closely 
resembling New York’s not because legislators from around the country 
admired the constitutional acumen of New Yorkers, but instead because they 
admired the constitutional acumen of the Supreme Court. Some sense of the 
Court’s emulative effect can be gleaned from the comments of a legislator in 
Puerto Rico who boasted that the territory’s newly enacted variable obscenity 
statute “was approved with the rules that the National Supreme Court has 
put to define what is obscenity.”264 Similarly, when the California legislature 
enacted a variable obscenity statute modeled on New York’s law, the state’s 
Attorney General testified in support of the measure that “the bill would 
bring California law into compliance” with Supreme Court precedent.265 
Some legislators attempted to extrapolate from Ginsberg an overarching 
principle that legislative bodies may adopt broadly drawn measures in an 
effort to protect minors from nudity. In 1972, four years after the Court issued 
Ginsberg, the city council of Jacksonville, Florida, enacted an ordinance that 
prohibited drive-in movie theaters from showing films with nudity if their 
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at G4 (noting that California’s legislation “borrow[s] the wording of ” Ginsberg). 
2021] The Supreme Court as Bad Teacher 1415 
screens were visible from public places.266 When a theater challenged the 
ordinance, Jacksonville sought to defend the measure by contending that it 
enacted the measure to shield minors from such visible displays. In Erznoznik 
v. City of Jacksonville, Justice Lewis Powell’s opinion for the Supreme Court 
invalidated the ordinance as in effect improperly stretching Ginsberg’s 
reasoning.267 Erznoznik clarified that Ginsberg had not authorized legislatures 
to ban minors from accessing all nude images, but only images that were 
obscene. “Clearly all nudity cannot be deemed obscene even as to minors,” 
Justice Powell explained.268 If Jacksonville intended to protect minors from 
all nudity, Powell reasoned, the ordinance was overbroad because it would bar 
films displaying “a baby’s buttocks, the nude body of a war victim, or scenes 
from a culture in which nudity is indigenous.”269 Erznoznik determined that 
Jacksonville’s extrapolation from Ginsberg was, in sum, a bridge too far. 
There is no reason to believe that Ginsberg represents some once-in-a-
lifetime teaching phenomenon for the Supreme Court. Other instances 
where the Supreme Court can be understood as teaching well by assisting 
policies in becoming more widespread no doubt exist.270 Legal scholars in a 
diverse array of fields ought to expend the energy required to unearth these 
examples of desirable policy diffusion so that a more thorough examination 
of the Supreme Court’s teaching capacities may finally commence. 
B. Bad Policy Suppression 
The Supreme Court can also act as a good teacher by invalidating 
undesirable policies. By ruling certain matters out of the nation’s bounds, the 
Supreme Court sends the important message that—even if majorities of 
important policymakers wish to enact particular measures—those measures may 
nevertheless be deemed constitutionally impermissible. If political scientists 
label the occurrence of measures growing more widespread as “policy diffusion,” 
the converse phenomenon might helpfully be termed policy suppression. To return 
 
266 Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 206 (1975) (quoting JACKSONVILLE, FLA., 
MUNICIPAL CODE § 330.313 (1972)). 
267 Id. at 207. 
268 Id. at 213. 
269 Id. 
270 Henry Glick’s work examining the fallout from the Supreme Court’s opinion upholding a 
state law in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990), indicates that 
other jurisdictions responded to the Missouri statute in the same way that jurisdictions responded 
to New York’s variable obscenity statute after Ginsberg. In Cruzan, the Supreme Court validated the 
Missouri requirement that a patient must exhibit by clear and convincing evidence a desire to have 
life support removed before that measure would be taken. Glick observed that post-Cruzan “many 
state legislatures changed their laws to conform” with Missouri’s statute, even though the decision 
required no such thing. Henry R. Glick, The Impact of Permissive Judicial Policies: The U.S. Supreme 
Court and the Right to Die, 47 POL. RSCH. Q. 207, 218 (1994). 
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to the educational metaphor, when the Court engages in policy suppression, it 
is roughly equivalent to an elementary teacher who corrects a student 
presentation misinforming the class that the earth’s surface is flat. 
This policy suppression phenomenon is readily illustrated by the Court’s 
opinion in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, where it invalidated 
measures found in all forty-eight states that permitted schools to expel students 
for refusing to salute the American flag.271 It seems highly improbable that 
Barnette instantly convinced all school administrators who were expelling 
Jehovah’s Witnesses that it was misguided to do so. Nevertheless, from a policy 
suppression viewpoint, the important aspect of Barnette is that the Court 
succeeded in interpreting the First Amendment to restore some measure of 
order to schools within the American constitutional order. Even if school 
administrators did not necessarily agree with Barnette, they nonetheless followed 
it. Schools throughout the country adhered to Barnette’s holding, as the 
expulsions of Jehovah’s Witnesses quickly dwindled in its wake.272 
Additional examples of the Supreme Court’s good teaching through policy 
suppression abound in constitutional law. Indeed, a decent portion of most 
introductory constitutional law courses are dedicated to examining opinions that 
involve the Court invalidating state or local governmental actions under one 
provision of the Constitution or another. Consider Loving v. Virginia, where the 
Court invalidated state antimiscegenation statutes.273 Also consider Plyler v. Doe, 
where the Court invalidated Texas’s effort to prevent unauthorized immigrants 
from attending public schools.274 Finally, consider Romer v. Evans, where the 
Court invalidated Colorado’s attempt to exclude sexual orientation from 
receiving protection under local antidiscrimination laws.275 The Court in those 
three opinions—and many others besides—invalidated measures enacted by 
various states, and removed those stains from the nation’s constitutional fabric. 
In so doing, the Court imparted the foundational lesson that some laws simply 
have no place in the United States. As with Barnette, these acts of policy 
suppression may not have eliminated overnight the underlying desire in other 
 
271 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
272 See MANWARING, supra note 73, at 242 (“[S]tate and local compliance with the Barnette 
ruling was immediate and substantial.”). 
273 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
274 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
275 517 U.S. 620 (1996). For an argument that can be understood as suggesting that the 
Supreme Court taught regrettable lessons regarding LGBT rights in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. 
Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018), see Netta Barak-Corren, Religious 
Exemptions Increase Discrimination Towards Same-Sex Couples: Evidence from Masterpiece Cakeshop, J. 
LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2021) (demonstrating that wedding service vendors were less willing to 
provide services to same-sex couples after Masterpiece Cakeshop was decided); Netta Barak-
Corren, A License to Discriminate? The Empirical Consequences and Normative Implications of Religious 
Exemptions, 56 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021). 
2021] The Supreme Court as Bad Teacher 1417 
states to enact similar measures. Indeed, one need not possess an especially 
fertile imagination to envision that some of those measures could still today 
achieve considerable support at least in certain quarters. Nevertheless, provided 
that the Court’s opinions remain good law, no real danger exists that such 
measures will be enforced. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS 
This Part examines three essential lessons that legal audiences should 
draw from appreciating how the Supreme Court has acted as a teacher, both 
for ill and for good. First, grasping the Supreme Court’s teaching role 
complicates a dominant view in modern constitutional scholarship 
contending that the Court merely amplifies the consensus attitudes of the 
American people. Second, contrary to persistent claims that the judiciary is 
institutionally incapable of producing meaningful reform, highlighting the 
Court’s teaching capacity demonstrates that social reformers are sometimes 
well served by pursuing their policy agendas through litigation rather than 
legislation. Third, reclaiming the notion that the Supreme Court teaches not 
only allows readers to step back and realize how metaphors pervade legal 
discourse, but also to glimpse how judges subscribing to the teaching 
metaphor might also shape law’s substance. 
A. Judicial Latitude 
Understanding that the Supreme Court has in fact played the role of a 
teacher challenges a prominent theory of modern constitutional scholarship 
holding that the Supreme Court interprets the Constitution in a manner that 
reflects the views of an existing national consensus or an emerging national 
consensus.276 On this theory, which I have elsewhere labeled consensus 
constitutionalism,277 the Supreme Court is portrayed as issuing opinions that 
serve merely to ratify popular attitudes.278 Accordingly, consensus 
constitutionalists insist, it makes little sense for law professors assessing the 
Court’s work in hindsight either to celebrate Justices for issuing opinions that 
society ultimately embraces or to condemn Justices for issuing opinions that 
 
276 See generally KLARMAN, supra note 136 (articulating a consensus constitutionalist 
framework); BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS 
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 
(2009) (advancing a consensus constitutionalist framework). 
277 See generally Justin Driver, The Consensus Constitution, 89 TEX. L. REV. 755 (2011) 
(identifying and critiquing consensus constitutionalism). 
278 See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 276, at 16 (contending Supreme Court opinions “serve as a 
catalyst, to force public debate, and ultimately to ratify the American people’s considered views 
about the meaning of their Constitution”). 
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society eventually rejects.279 When legal scholars applaud and bemoan 
Supreme Court opinions from yesteryear, this theory contends, they ignore 
the contemporaneous environments within which the Court actually 
operated—a tendency that leads legal academics to miscast Supreme Court 
Justices in the roles of villains and heroes.280 Justices certainly wear black 
robes, but consensus constitutionalists assert that it is delusional to perceive 
them as accessorizing the outfits with black hats—or white ones either.281 
At first glance, the three bad teacher opinions examined above might 
plausibly be construed as reinforcing the idea of consensus constitutionalism. 
After all, consensus constitutionalists could note, the Supreme Court’s opinions 
in Buck, Gobitis, and Belton can each be understood as validating policies within 
national environments that featured considerable support for the measures. In 
Buck, the Court validated compulsory sterilization in an environment where the 
influential Progressive movement championed the cause.282 In Gobitis, the Court 
validated compulsory flag salutes in an intensely patriotic environment, with the 
United States hurtling toward involvement in World War II.283 In Belton, the 
Court validated law enforcement’s ability to search vehicles when arresting 
motorists in an environment beset by concern with drug trafficking and drug 
usage.284 To portray the Court as a “bad teacher” in these three decisions, 
 
279 See, e.g., KLARMAN, supra note 136, at 443-68 (emphasizing that the Supreme Court’s 
reviled decision in Plessy v. Ferguson and its celebrated decision in Brown v. Board of Education should 
both be understood as products of their times—and extending that broad principle to the Court’s 
work as a whole). 
280 See, e.g., KLARMAN, supra note 136, at 6 (critiquing the tendency within legal scholarship 
to lionize judicial heroes and vilify judicial villains). 
281 See JEREMY AGNEW, THE OLD WEST IN FACT AND FILM 131 (2012) (noting the 
convention in Western films of having heroes wear white hats and villains wear black hats to 
symbolize the struggle between good and evil). 
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Republicans and Democrats Agree: End the War on Drugs, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2020), 
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consensus constitutionalists might protest, is to overestimate the Court’s 
capacity for offering resistance to emerging and existing societal agreement on 
such matters. On this account, rather than censuring the Supreme Court for its 
decisions in Buck, Gobitis, and Belton, any opprobrium should instead be directed 
toward the nation as a whole because that is where the responsibility actually lay. 
Upon closer inspection, however, it becomes clear that accepting the 
consensus constitutionalist account of these three opinions improperly 
obscures the ample judicial latitude that the Supreme Court possessed to 
issue countervailing opinions in these cases. In Buck, it seems more accurate 
to construe the Court’s opinion as extinguishing the dominant legal 
viewpoint that rejected compulsory sterilization statutes rather than as 
acquiescing to a national consensus that affirmed the legitimacy of such 
statutes.285 In Gobitis, while many school officials across the nation seized the 
opportunity to expel Jehovah’s Witnesses for refusing to salute the American 
flag, the decision also elicited many vehement critiques, particularly in elite 
circles.286 In Belton, it seems highly improbable that the nation evinced 
anything approaching a consensus attitude on the relatively low-salience 
question of whether warrant requirements apply when officers arrest 
motorists; indeed, even within consensus constitutionalism’s own outlook, 
any suggestion of national consensus seems undermined by the sharply 
divergent views that lower courts expressed on this question before Belton.287 
In each of these three bad teacher cases, then, there can be little doubt 
that the Court enjoyed sufficient judicial latitude to issue an opinion 
invalidating the contested policies. Even scrutinizing the context where the 
consensus constitutionalist argument appears to contain the greatest 
explanatory force actually serves only to highlight the immense judicial 
latitude that the Court typically possesses when issuing decisions. With 
patriotic sentiment running high in 1940, it may initially seem unfathomable 
that the Court in Gobitis could have realistically instructed local school 
districts to refrain from expelling any students for refusing to salute the 
American flag, let alone students who were part of a deeply unpopular 
religious minority. Yet, this consensus-based argument collapses in the face 
of the Court’s decision in Barnette, an opinion that appeared in 1943, during 
the thick of the nation’s involvement in World War II and at a time when the 
conflict’s outcome remained deeply uncertain. Protecting free speech during 
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Court summoned the judicial will to vindicate the infringed constitutional 
rights.288 If the Court possessed enough judicial latitude to issue Barnette 
within that tense historical moment, it seems undeniable that it could have 
also invalidated the measures found in Buck and Belton. 
Thus, one need not ignore historical context in order to criticize the 
Supreme Court for teaching badly or to maintain that it could have 
realistically taught well in all three of these cases by invalidating the policies. 
These Supreme Court opinions permitted and enabled what were at the time 
widely, though not universally, regarded as undesirable policies to become 
more widespread still. Contrary to the consensus constitutionalism approach, 
those opinions were in no way dictated by dominant social attitudes. 
Accordingly, it is completely appropriate to critique all three opinions as 
having imparted regrettable teachings that damaged our constitutional order. 
Conversely, just as it is appropriate to criticize the Supreme Court for 
teaching badly, it is also appropriate to commend the Supreme Court for 
teaching well. Consensus constitutionalists express skepticism when scholars 
praise Supreme Court Justices for issuing opinions that are vindicated over 
time because such praise, they contend, overlooks the deeper background 
forces in society that actually produced the celebrated opinion. Yet such 
consensus-inflected accounts can accord the Court too little credit for a job 
well done. In Ginsberg, the Court’s opinion vindicating the very specific and 
narrowly drawn variable obscenity statute produced in New York enabled 
other legislatures around the nation to learn from the statute and to address 
the underlying concern in a targeted, sensible fashion. By upholding an 
exemplary statute that avoided the harms flowing from a hysterical, overbroad 
approach to the issue, the Court taught the nation a valuable lesson in 
preserving the freedom of expression. Thus, even if it is presumed that the 
Court would almost inevitably have upheld some statute restricting minors 
from obscenity, the Ginsberg Court should nevertheless be commended for 
selecting the extremely specific New York measure instead of a statute that 
wantonly stifled speech. 
The Court should also be commended for teaching well when it 
constitutionally invalidates measures and, in the process, suppresses 
undesirable policies. To take only two examples of relatively recent vintage, 
the Court’s opinions in Plyler v. Doe and Romer v. Evans protected 
marginalized members of society and instructed unmistakably that certain 
state laws—excluding unauthorized immigrants from public schools and 
excluding sexual minorities from the reach of local antidiscrimination law, 
 
288 See generally GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 
(2004) (observing that protection for the freedom of expression is often sacrificed during war time). 
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respectively—clashed with our constitutional traditions.289 While each of 
these measures only existed in one state when the Court invalidated them, it 
would be severely mistaken to dismiss the opinions as merely reflecting the 
nation’s consensus attitudes.290 To the contrary, substantial evidence indicates 
that the measures at issue in Plyler and Romer would have—in the absence of 
the Court’s invalidation—become prevalent.291 Accordingly, the opinions 
eliminating these regrettable policies should be celebrated for imparting 
valuable constitutional lessons to the nation. 
B. Judicial Fragility 
Appreciating that the Supreme Court possesses the capacity to teach also 
complicates the influential idea within legal scholarship that aspiring social 
reformers should necessarily turn their attention away from courts and 
instead focus their energy on legislators. Although many scholars have 
emphasized what they regard as the Court’s fundamental fragility, no single 
work has advanced this argument with greater intensity than Gerald 
Rosenberg’s The Hollow Hope. “Turning to the courts to produce significant 
social reform substitutes the myth of America for its reality. It credits courts 
and judicial decisions with a power that they do not have,” Rosenberg 
argues.292 When social reformers pursue litigation rather than legislation, 
Rosenberg warns, they misdirect limited financial resources that would be 
better dedicated to political mobilization.293 In Rosenberg’s account, filing 
lawsuits is strategically unwise because litigation possesses little or no 
capacity for generating the inspirational effects found in the political arena: 
“Rally round the flag is one thing but rally round the brief (or opinion) is 
quite another!”294 This broad skepticism of the Supreme Court’s ability to 
shape society, however, requires considerable revision. 
Advising social reformers to abandon judges in favor of legislators 
imposes a false strategic binary on individuals who seek to advance their 
respective causes. Such advice obscures how judicial victories can 
subsequently be translated into policy and legislative victories—a dynamic 
that the Court’s underappreciated role in making measures more widespread 
throughout the nation elucidates. Reformers do not invariably squander 
resources when they pursue their agendas through litigation rather than 
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legislation. To the contrary, winning a Supreme Court case can constitute a 
wise financial investment because of judicial opinions’ capacity for teaching. 
However wrongheaded were the aims of advocates seeking compulsory flag 
salute measures, for example, it is exceedingly difficult to construe them as 
squandering their resources by obtaining victory in Gobitis. It seems evident 
that school administrators adopted the relevant policies far more extensively 
than they would have in the absence of such a high-profile legal triumph. 
In some instances, moreover, reformers are virtually required to file lawsuits 
initially in order to dispel pervasive fears that its preferred policies are 
unconstitutional. In both Buck and Ginsberg, advocates of compulsory 
sterilization and variable obscenity statutes can be understood as using litigation 
to eliminate existing impediments to their policy preferences—victories that 
were necessary to obtain before they could concentrate squarely upon the 
business of promoting legislation. Similarly, social reformers who want the 
Court to engage in policy suppression may well find their best opportunities for 
success exist in the courthouse rather than the statehouse. Indeed, numerous 
social reformers addressed above turned to the courts precisely because they 
recently suffered legislative defeats. For the groups who lost battles in three 
different statewide contests—involving a compulsory flag salute measure, 
legislation excluding unauthorized immigrants from school, and a statewide 
antigay referendum—the judiciary represented the only viable hope they had on 
the immediate horizon. The judicial victories secured in Barnette, Plyler, and 
Romer advanced those causes in momentous ways, and—contrary to those who 
emphasize the Court’s alleged fragility in vindicating contested constitutional 
rights295—those decisions produced not merely a triumph of symbolism but 
durable, tangible results. 
Focusing on the Supreme Court’s teaching role also suggests that its 
capacity for inspiration is considerably more vigorous than Rosenberg’s 
jocular assessment acknowledges. Perhaps nowhere is the Court’s ability to 
inspire people to “rally around the opinion” more apparent than in the context 
of compulsory sterilization.296 Harry Laughlin desired the Supreme Court’s 
imprimatur on a compulsory sterilization statute in large part because he 
thought that an opinion validating the practice would demonstrate 
sterilization’s mainstream appeal and render it impossible to dismiss as a 
fringe phenomenon.297 Laughlin’s plan worked: the Virginia measure 
validated in Buck provided a model statute for jurisdictions around the 
country. Justice Holmes’s oft-repeated aphorism from Buck—which quickly 
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became the sterilization movement’s unofficial motto, both internally and 
externally—crystallizes the Court’s capacity for inspiring reform 
movements.298 Just as the Supreme Court possesses the ability to inspire 
proponents, moreover, it is important to realize that the Court also possesses 
the ability to dissuade opponents. Although several elected officials expressed 
constitutional opposition to compulsory sterilization measures before Buck, 
Justice Holmes’s opinion seems to have (at least temporarily) cut the 
constitutional legs out from under the opposition.299 While these dynamics 
may appear most starkly in Buck, these effects of inspiration and dissuasion 
cannot be limited to the context of sterilization during the 1920s and 1930s. 
At least on occasion, the Supreme Court issues opinions that shape the 
underlying policy and legislative landscapes more profoundly than skeptical 
assessments like The Hollow Hope allow. Reformers who wish to see their 
ambitions realized would be foolish to ignore the Court’s capacity for 
teaching. It would, of course, be mistaken to view the Court as an all-powerful 
entity, as some scholars seemed to assume before Rosenberg’s insightful 
corrective arrived. But it would also be mistaken to overcorrect the earlier 
narrative and construe the Court as a powerless entity.300 Teachers are not 
omnipotent, but sometimes they make a real difference. 
C. Metaphors Matter 
At this point, some readers may be tempted to dismiss this extended effort 
to place the teaching metaphor on firmer ground as constituting an exercise in 
sheer frivolity. With so many momentous legal questions worthy of addressing, 
this critique might run, why pursue a question that seems of little consequence 
or perhaps even no consequence at all? Rather than engaging in a meta-
scholarship debate that analogizes the Supreme Court’s role to the teaching 
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profession, this critique may continue, it would be far more worthwhile to 
dedicate that energy toward analyzing, say, a recent Supreme Court opinion. 
This objection, however, misses the mark. The simple explanation is that, 
when it comes to the law, metaphors matter. So many distinguished legal 
scholars over the years have explored the educational metaphor regarding the 
Supreme Court not because they were engaging in an intellectual frolic but 
rather because they understood that metaphors have consistently played a 
significant role in shaping legal realities. The centrality of legal metaphors 
clearly applies at the level of particular legal doctrines, as Supreme Court 
opinions have often invoked metaphors when adjudicating cases. In the First 
Amendment context alone, for example, Justices have repeatedly argued that 
the Constitution establishes a “marketplace of ideas,”301 guards against 
“chilling effects,”302 and erects “a wall of separation” between church and 
state.303 These metaphors—and many others besides—do not serve as mere 
window dressing; instead, they have been integral to the Court’s analysis and 
have shaped its determinations. 
More pertinently, legal metaphors also exert influence in ways that 
transcend the substance of isolated doctrines and apply to the judicial system 
as a general proposition. Writing more than four decades ago, then-Justice 
William H. Rehnquist advanced precisely this point when he published a law 
review article criticizing the idea that the Constitution should be viewed as a 
living, evolving document. “While it is undoubtedly true, as Mr. Justice 
Holmes said, that ‘general propositions do not decide concrete cases,’ general 
phrases such as [the Living Constitution] have a way of subtly coloring the 
way we think about concrete cases,” Rehnquist wrote.304 More recently, 
Justice Antonin Scalia’s extrajudicial writing and speaking took aim at the 
Living Constitution metaphor. In making an extended case for originalism in 
1998, Scalia complained: “The ascendant school of constitutional 
interpretation affirms the existence of what is called The Living Constitution, 
a body of law that . . . grows and changes from age to age, in order to meet 
the needs of a changing society.”305 In 2011, Scalia informed the Senate 
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38 (new ed. 2018). 
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Judiciary Committee that he was “hoping the Living Constitution will die.”306 
Rehnquist and Scalia have attacked the idea of a Living Constitution, in other 
words, because they understood that allowing the metaphor to go uncontested 
may eventually produce judicial opinions that they would dislike. Although 
Scalia could plausibly portray living constitutionalism as the dominant 
framework in 1998, that task would be considerably more difficult today.307 If 
originalism is now ascendant, living constitutionalism has experienced a sharp 
decline.308 In response to this dynamic, however, a few liberal law professors 
have recently mounted defenses of the Living Constitution metaphor.309 
These legal scholars, like Rehnquist and Scalia, appreciate that the metaphor’s 
vitality may have important consequences for the nation’s developing body of 
constitutional law. 
Widespread belief in the significance of judicial metaphors can also be 
observed in the many responses elicited by the judge-as-umpire analogy that 
then-Judge John Roberts offered during his confirmation hearings to become 
Chief Justice in 2005.310 Law professors certainly did not shy away from 
interrogating Roberts’s analogy.311 Of perhaps even greater significance, 
though, many judges and former judges of considerable distinction have 
explored Roberts’s umpire analogy—with some of them deeming it 
illuminative of the judicial undertaking and others deeming it obfuscatory.312 
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Setting aside the particular question of whether the judge-as-umpire analogy 
in fact provides an accurate portrayal of judging, however, the larger point is 
that judges themselves demonstrate extensive engagement with metaphors 
that purport to describe the judiciary. It would be surprising, of course, if 
such professional self-conceptions did not in some meaningful sense inform 
how judges performed their responsibilities. 
If legal metaphors sometimes affect judges in substantive ways—as Justice 
Rehnquist long ago posited—the question becomes: is it normatively 
desirable to have Supreme Court Justices understand themselves as issuing 
opinions that teach, in the manner that this Article has suggested? Substantial 
benefits seem likely to flow from Justices accepting this notion of judicial 
teaching. Internalizing this idea of teaching would encourage Justices to assess 
their decisions by taking the long view, motivating them to contemplate 
whether subsequent generations will embrace their opinions or reject them. 
In addition, being aware that the Court has taught badly in its history should 
encourage Justices to confront even more directly whether issuing a particular 
opinion could result in incorrect constitutional lessons spreading throughout 
the nation. History suggests that Justices should be particularly sensitive to 
the danger of teaching badly when they assess legislation and policies that can 
meaningfully be understood as the products of repressive politics. Being 
aware that the Court has periodically taught well, moreover, should encourage 
Justices to bear in mind that many of Court’s most celebrated moments have 
occurred when it has invalidated state and local measures that undermine 
central notions of equality and liberty. Finally, when the Court issues an 
opinion validating a particular measure, the Justices should do so 
understanding that the measure may well proliferate due to the Court’s 
validation, and that other jurisdictions may seek to extend the measure. 
Opinions validating measures do not necessarily guarantee that they will 
become more widespread, but Justices should at least entertain that real 
possibility before issuing decisions. 
Highlighting these virtues, however, should not be taken to disregard the 
possibility that having Justices who subscribe to the Court-as-teacher 
metaphor could yield negative consequences. One especially unattractive 
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consequence of Justices perceiving themselves as teachers is that doing so 
could invite them to develop grandiose conceptions of their role in American 
society. Teachers are typically regarded as important and knowledgeable 
authority figures, and Justices—with this exalted vision of teaching in mind—
could well increase the psychic distance they place between themselves and 
the rest of society.313 In this vein, it may be no accident that former Justice 
Anthony Kennedy—a man sometimes accused of reveling inordinately in the 
trappings of judicial power314—has most readily embraced the notion that 
judges are teachers. If Justices who are under the influence of the teaching 
spell somehow grew to consider themselves omniscient entities, that 
development would be regrettable. Yet this account may exaggerate the 
downsides of Justices endorsing the teaching metaphor. As an initial matter, 
internalizing the notion that the Court has taught badly should lead the 
Justices to develop strong senses of teacher humility. The teaching metaphor, 
moreover, could not plausibly be blamed for single-handedly causing judicial 
feelings of omniscience; such sentiments, of course, long predate that 
metaphor’s introduction into constitutional conservation. At most, then, the 
teaching metaphor could be assessed responsibility for intensifying judicial 
grandiosity, not for instigating it. 
In any event, the significance of the Court-as-teacher notion should not 
be overstated in its ability to control substantive legal outcomes. Indeed, two 
Justices, both of whom subscribe to the notion that Supreme Court opinions 
can teach, could well find themselves on opposing sides of the same case. One 
Justice may view a case as presenting an opportunity to teach well by 
invalidating a measure and thus attempt to suppress an unwise policy. 
Conversely, another Justice may view that case as presenting an opportunity 
to teach well by upholding a measure and thus enable other jurisdictions to 
learn, emulate, and extrapolate from that measure. Justices bring different 
judicial philosophies with them to the bench, and those philosophical 
differences may at least periodically—and perhaps even frequently—trump 
any metaphorical commonality. In sum, legal metaphors matter to the judicial 
process, but it would be ludicrous to contend that they are the only things 
that matter. Any suggestion to the contrary should itself be rejected as an 
instance of bad teaching. 
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CONCLUSION 
Several decades have now elapsed since Eugene Rostow first asserted that the 
Supreme Court played the role of a teacher in the American constitutional order. 
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the voluminous scholarship that has 
subsequently invoked this analogy in subsequent years is how little that mountain 
of writing has served to refine and develop Rostow’s observation. This Article 
has endeavored to recast understandings of how the Court teaches by analyzing 
the question from a novel perspective. Instead of beginning the inquiry by 
conceiving of the Court as a supremely gifted teacher, this Article instead 
addressed the issue from the opposite tack, identifying and analyzing instances 
where the Court was a strikingly inept teacher. In response to steady criticisms 
of the teaching metaphor emphasizing that American citizens are generally 
unaware of judicial decisions and therefore do not much resemble students, this 
Article has provided detailed case studies illuminating how Court opinions have 
in fact taught discrete groups of policymakers in various constitutional settings. 
Moreover, in response to steady criticisms regarding the absence of tangible 
evidence indicating the Court’s supposedly educational role, this Article has 
demonstrated how Supreme Court opinions have stimulated policymakers to 
learn, emulate, and extrapolate lessons and thereby enabled Court-validated 
measures to become more widespread. Somewhat counterintuitively, by focusing 
upon how the Court has taught badly, it becomes easier to see how the Court has 
taught well—by both facilitating the spread of constitutionally desirable policies 
and suppressing constitutionally undesirable policies. Comprehending how the 
Court actually teaches, both for good and for ill, yields significant insight into 
today’s modern legal landscape by inviting reassessment of dominant theories 
within legal academia. Thus, while some scholars have suggested that viewing the 
Supreme Court as a teacher is more confounding than clarifying, it turns out that 
demands to remove the educational metaphor from legal discourse altogether 
now themselves appear misguided. 
